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  Migrants in the United States experience varying degrees of harm 
related to family separation. This article focuses on the economic 
dimensions of these harms by focusing on transnational remittances, a 
topic that has generated significant scholarly attention. Within this 
story, remitters are pitched as heroes and remittances are held up as a 
critical, market-based solution for solving global poverty. Of course, 
this picture is incomplete. This account ignores remittance-sending 
countries and provides only a narrow account of law. This Article 
focuses on anti-money laundering policies, an important set of U.S. 
laws that regulate the remittance economy. Examining remittances 
from this perspective shows that anti-money laundering and 
antimigration policies form a joint project that regulates the 
relationship between migrants and their family members. While 
antimigration laws inhibit migrant mobility, anti-money laundering 
laws create uneven opportunities for transferring wage earnings to 
family members left behind on their journey. Recognizing the 
connection between these areas of the law leads to the Article’s broader 
contribution: identifying different ways that the law exacerbates or 
mitigates the economic harms related to family separation. Specifically, 
anti-money laundering policies help structure the conditions in which 
migrants engage in expression of affinity across borders, thereby 
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showing the intertwined nature of economic and physical harms within 
transnational families. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ............................................................................................ 846 
I.  Remittances as Economic Expressions of Affinity ........................ 852 
II.  Remittances in a World of Reduced Migrant Mobility ............... 860 
A. Anti-Money Laundering Laws and their Regulators ....... 861 
B. Gatekeepers in the Anti-money Laundering System ...... 864 
C. Blocking and Narrowing ..................................................... 868 
D. A Joint Regulatory System ................................................. 874 
E.  Deference to Enforcement Decisions ................................ 880 
III.  Theorizing the Law Regulating Remittances .............................. 883 
A. Legal Commitments ............................................................. 885 
B. Political Commitments ........................................................ 889 
IV.  Economic Expressions of Affinity in Related Contexts ............ 894 
A. Family Unity ......................................................................... 895 
B. Wage Earnings ...................................................................... 900 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 905 
INTRODUCTION 
A significant body of scholarship has focused on remittances,1 
defined as funds or assets sent to other countries via formal channels 
such as banks or money transfer services.2 Their story has been told by 
economists, sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists and it 
goes something like this: workers, almost always migrants, send wages 
to loved ones in their countries of origin.3 As these loved ones receive 
an influx of capital and gain economic security, the economies of their 
 
 1.  Although remittances originate within many countries across the globe, in this article I 
focus on the funds or assets that are sent from the United States to other countries. While 
remitters can share capital informally such as through in-person gifts, I focus on capital shared 
through formal channels such as banks or money transfer services. See Abby Budiman & Phillip 
Connor, Migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean Sent a Record Amount of Money to 
Their Home Countries in 2016, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/01/23/migrants-from-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-sent-a-record-amount-of-money-
to-their-home-countries-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/UQ28-SCLT]. 
 2.  See id. (stating that remittances exclude gifts and other assets of value that are given in 
person or through informal channels).  
 3.  See Nurith Aizenman, Mexicans in the U.S. Are Sending Home More Money Than Ever, 
NPR (Feb. 10, 2017, 8:41 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/02/10/514172676/ 
mexicans-in-the-u-s-are-sending-home-more-money-than-ever [https://perma.cc/9MV7-A3ZY] 
(reporting that the annual remittances topped $69 billion in 2016).  
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home countries also benefit, with consumer goods purchased, houses 
built, tuition bills paid, and investments made in small businesses. 
Within this story, remitters are called “heroes”4 and remittances are 
held up as a critical, market-based tool in the fight against global 
poverty.5 
This story is incomplete. For one thing, while scholars have had 
much to say about remittance-receiving countries, they have had much 
less to say about remittance-sending countries like the United States.6 
We know a lot about the benefits that remittances produce for 
recipients but know much less about the remitters whose wages prop 
up this transnational economy. Such an omission might be 
understandable except that remitters are often migrants working in the 
United States, a topic of scholarly inquiry that has suffered from no 
shortage of political or scholarly attention from immigration and other 
public law scholars. For another, this account has provided a relatively 
narrow account of the law’s role in regulating remittance channels. 
Scholars have mostly focused on whether and how tax laws might be 
calibrated to meet welfarist goals,7 an important conversation but one 
that has not examined how remittances flow in the context of the 
punitive laws that define domestic law enforcement policies. 
This is an article about those domestic law enforcement policies. 
In particular, I am interested in anti-money laundering laws, which 
were designed to disrupt the flow of cross-border financial transfers 
related to terrorism and serious criminal activity like drug or human 
 
 4.  See Ricardo Guzman, Migrants Are Living Heroes / Social Distancing Flattens the Curve, 
MEX. BUS. NEWS (May 5, 2020, 11:56 AM), https://mexicobusiness.news/policyandeconomy/ 
news/migrants-are-living-heroes-social-distancing-flattens-curve [https://perma.cc/TE4U-9XGM].  
 5.  See generally Carol Adelman, Global Philanthropy and Remittances: Reinventing 
Foreign Aid, 15 BROWN J. WORLD AFFS. 23 (2009) (discussing how remittances and philanthropy 
supplement and influence government foreign aid); Richard H. Adams Jr. & John Page, Do 
International Migration and Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD 
DEV. 1645 (2005) (finding that an increase in international remittances leads to a decline in 
poverty). 
 6.  For the most part, this scholarship has neglected the broader legal, political, and 
administrative domestic context in which these wages are earned and remitted. One exception is 
Cecilia Menjivar, Julie DaVanzo, Lisa Greenwell & R. Burciaga Valdez, Remittance Behavior 
Among Salvadoran and Filipino Immigrants in Los Angeles, 32 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 97 (1998). 
But even while Menjivar and her coauthors focus on the domestic elements of the transnational 
remittance economy, their focus remains on the migrants themselves, see id. at 98, rather than the 
legal and governmental actors charged with regulating this economy.  
 7.  See, e.g., Shayak Sarkar, Capital Controls as Migrant Controls, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 
808–21 (2021); Ariel Stevenson, Recovering Lost Tax Revenue Through Taxation of Transnational 
Households, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 100, 103 (2016); Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 37–40 (2008). 
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trafficking. Banks and other financial institutions provide the 
infrastructure for this transnational economy, and the anti-money 
laundering policies, in turn, subject these institutions to a host of 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements.8 Through these laws, 
federal agencies can shape, constrain, and sometimes block altogether 
remittance flows altogether, especially when remittances are intended 
for recipients in countries closely associated with terrorist or criminal 
activity. More broadly, these laws empower banks to make their own 
calls about the kinds of international transactions that present a cover 
for unlawful activity, leading to delays in completing transfers or 
canceling them altogether.  
These fluctuations take a particular toll on poor migrants who, like 
most if not all poor community members, struggle to have their 
banking needs met.9 Unlike tax laws, which regulate remittances either 
at the point of earning wages (in the United States) or at the point of 
consumption (in another country), anti-money laundering laws disrupt 
remittance channels (the process by which funds travel from the 
United States to another country). As a result, regulators and financial 
institutions can shape migrants’ ability to remit wages for reasons that 
are not always transparent and that can feel arbitrary. 
Against this backdrop, this Article hopes to make two primary 
contributions. The first is to demonstrate how anti-money laundering 
policies work together with antimigration policies to create a system of 
social and economic control over migrants in the United States. These 
two sets of policies share common origins; rely on similar regulatory 
logics, such as the use of private gatekeepers; and are subject to the 
same pathologies, such as abuse in the form of surveillance and bias. 
Taken together, this system of laws that governs both the flow of 
capital and the movement of people enables a mix of public and private 
actors to interpret and enforce laws in ways that are ad hoc and subject 
to little judicial oversight. This flexibility is often justified by the nature 
of the regulatory goal, namely the disruption of financial support for 
criminal and terrorist activity, an undesirable and dangerous enterprise 
that unfolds furtively and across national boundaries. But this far-
reaching enforcement approach also sweeps up innocuous behavior 
like migrant remittances and empowers regulators and bank officials 
 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, 
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 1, 138–39 (2015). 
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to pursue goals in ways that don’t always bear an obvious relationship 
to these laws’ anticrime and antiterrorist foundations. 
Analyzing anti-money laundering laws as a set of rules governing 
migrant economic opportunities clarifies and contextualizes the 
underlying logic of modern immigration policies. The top four 
remittance-receiving countries are Mexico, China, India, and the 
Philippines.10 These are the same four countries where the demand for 
migration opportunities far exceeds the supply, as reflected by the long 
wait times for immigrant visas.11 This account reaffirms the observation 
that people often experience the physical movement and transfer of 
funds across borders as interrelated phenomena, a reminder of the 
importance of “bottom-up” approaches to legal scholarship. At the 
same time, centering anti-money laundering policies highlights how 
regulators can use the interrelated nature of migration and remittances 
to pursue a variety of regulatory goals. To take one example, President 
Trump issued a travel ban to thwart migration,12 invoked emergency 
powers to start a trade war (which may or may not have pressured 
Mexico to agree to help enforce immigration laws at the border),13 and 
threatened to constrain remittance channels to pay for a wall.14 While 
the pace at which the Trump administration rolled out these policies 
 
 10.  WORLD BANK GRP., MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND 
OUTLOOK 2 fig.1.2 (2019), https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/ 
Migrationanddevelopmentbrief31.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJR7-9H8Q]. 
 11.  See Akila Muthukumar, Life in Limbo: Pandemic Policy and Immigration Backlogs, 
HARV. POL. REV. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://harvardpolitics.com/life-in-limbo [https://perma.cc/ 
28XV-44S3]; BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN FOR 
JANUARY 2021, at 2–3 (2021), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/ 
visabulletin_january2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKU9-ZTS3] (listing China, Indian, Mexico, and 
Philippine wait times separately from bulk of applications). 
 12.  See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018). 
 13.  See Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Mexico Agreed To Take Border Actions 
Months Before Trump Announced Tariff Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/us/politics/trump-mexico-deal-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/ 
K5VK-J6RU]. 
 14.  See Bob Woodward & Roberta Costa, Trump Reveals How He Would Force Mexico To 
Pay for Border Wall, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), http://wapo.st/236XOtH [https://perma.cc/ 
6NW7-KHMQ]. 
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was frenetic,15 that administration was not unique in its willingness to 
mix and match these two sets of legal tools.16 
This leads to the Article’s broader goal: to illuminate the quiet and 
nonobvious forms of family separation that pervade the U.S. 
immigration system.17 Within an immigration system that largely 
prohibits unencumbered movement across borders, antimigration 
policies disrupt a crucial means of maintaining emotional connections 
across Westphalian space. It is tempting to write off these types of 
harms as the unintended consequences of a legal regime created to 
address existential threats like terrorism or morally repugnant 
activities like drug and human trafficking. Under this view, the 
disruption of remittance flows is an unfortunate but acceptable cost in 
light of the social benefits of preventing mass atrocities.18 But an audit 
of U.S. anti-money laundering policies should account for the full 
range of costs that come with such policies.  
The costs of these policies include disrupting or blocking remitters 
from economically reaffirming familiar versions of love and affinity 
expressed between and among family members: gratitude,19 
 
 15.  See SARAH PIERCE & JESSICA BOLTER, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., DISMANTLING AND 
RECONSTRUCTING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 1 (2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
sites/default/files/publications/MPI_US-Immigration-Trump-Presidency-Final.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/R9NN-BD5W] (“After pledging to take one of the most activist agendas on 
immigration in modern times, the administration has delivered on nearly everything the president 
promised on the campaign trail, almost exclusively via executive fiat, ignoring a Congress he had 
originally pledged to work with on systemic reform.”).  
 16.  See DEP’T OF TREASURY & DEP’T OF JUST., THE NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING 
STRATEGY FOR 1999, at 58 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/money.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT6A-UL65] (recommending that the 
president invoke his powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to block 
economic transactions where such transactions threaten the national security and economy of the 
United States). 
 17.  See Stephen Lee, Family Separation as Slow Death, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2319, 2359–60 
(2019). 
 18.  See CLAY LOWERY & VIJAYA RAMACHANDRAN, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING POLICIES FOR POOR COUNTRIES: A CGD WORKING GROUP 
REPORT 2, 15–27 (2015), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-WG-Report-
Unintended-Consequences-AML-Policies-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6FC-CG65] (describing 
the impacts that anti-money laundering policies have on remittance flows). 
 19.  See RHACEL SALAZAR PARREÑAS, SERVANTS OF GLOBALIZATION: MIGRATION AND 
DOMESTIC WORK 83 (2015). 
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obligation,20 guilt,21 and nostalgia.22 Many migrants come to the United 
States knowing that a long-term separation from their family members 
is likely to follow, and for this reason, rely on remittances to maintain 
familial bonds for the duration of the separation. Economic 
circumstances vary across migration trajectories, and for this reason, 
remittances as expressions of affinity should not be romanticized. In 
some instances, remittances might top off a recipient’s income, while 
in other instances, such capital flows literally mean the difference 
between survival and a poverty-induced demise. Despite the 
differences in economic impact generated by remittances across 
contexts, the common thread connecting these money transfers is the 
familial relationship prompting and perpetuating the transfers in the 
first place. 
Part I of this Article provides a primer on remittances, the central 
aim of which is to provide monetary support for family members in 
countries outside of the United States, especially in the Global South. 
Part II explains how anti-money laundering policies regulate the 
transnational remittance economy. Specifically, I discuss how 
regulators and gatekeepers exercise enforcement authority in ways 
that narrow and sometimes outright eliminate remittance corridors. 
These policies do not impact remitters evenly. Indeed, they exacerbate 
inequalities that already exist on the basis of immigration status, class, 
and race or national origin. This Part also shows how anti-money 
laundering policies and antimigration policies form a joint regulatory 
project impacting the lives and livelihood of migrants. Part III explores 
how this adjusted descriptive picture—one that includes both anti-
money laundering and antimigration policies—can help scholars 
theorize the role that law ought to play in regulating the remittance 
economy. Finally, Part IV examines economic expressions of affinity 
in related legal contexts. Recognizing the economic dimensions of 
family separation can help inform and shape debates in adjacent 
contexts. 
 
 20.  See HUNG CAM THAI, INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: THE CULTURE OF MONEY IN LOW-WAGE 
TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES 70 (2014). 
 21.  Allison J. Petrozziello, Feminised Financial Flows: How Gender Affects Remittances in 
Honduran-US Transnational Families, 19 GENDER & DEV. 53, 63 (2011). 
 22.  Susan Bibler Coutin, Being En Route, 107 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 195, 202 (2005) 
(describing the formation of hometown associations as a form of “practiced nostalgia” by 
migrants in the United States). For background information on the role of hometown associations 
in generating remittances, see generally Manuel Orozco & Michelle Lapointe, Mexican 
Hometown Associations and Development Opportunities, 57 J. INT’L AFFS. 31 (2004).  
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I.  REMITTANCES AS ECONOMIC EXPRESSIONS OF AFFINITY 
Although the subject of remittances has enjoyed significant 
scholarly attention, especially from economists and social scientists, 
legal scholarship has not offered much on the topic.23 For this reason, 
this Part lays out the basics of the transnational remittance economy, 
focusing first on macrotrends and then delving into some of the 
qualitative aspects of the economy to highlight the social meaning of 
remittances.  
It would be difficult to overstate the global significance of the U.S. 
economy, which generates more remittances than any other country.24 
Of the 247 million migrants in the world, more find their way into the 
United States than any other country,25 and unsurprisingly, the U.S. 
labor market generates more remittances than that of any other 
country.26 Recent estimates suggest that the United States sends out 
roughly $67 billion to the rest of the world.27  
Given the degree to which other countries rely on remittance 
flows originating in the United States, access to capital features 
prominently in U.S. foreign policy goals. These goals include fostering 
the development of local economies or providing humanitarian relief 
for disasters and other unforeseen crises. Within this context, 
remittances provide a significant source of capital that is available to 
advance broader goals related to fighting poverty or mitigating the 
fallout from regional disasters. In this regard, remittances are no 
different than foreign aid or assistance packages dispensed by U.S. 
agencies. At the same time, remittances are different in that they derive 
 
 23.  For some notable exceptions, see generally Sarkar, supra note 7; Stevenson, supra note 
7; Rosser, supra note 7. 
 24.  Remittance Flows Worldwide in 2017, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/interactives/remittance-flows-by-country [https://perma.cc/ 
297X-TXUD] (stating that $148 billion in remittances were sent from the United States to other 
countries in 2017); see also Aizenman, supra note 3 (reporting that the annual remittances topped 
$69 billion in 2016). 
 25.  See Paul Adams, Migration: Are More People on the Move Than Ever Before?, BBC 
NEWS (May 28, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-32912867 [https://perma.cc/NHR4-85ZP] 
(explaining that the United States is the end destination for the largest percentage of the world’s 
immigrants).  
 26.  See WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 10, at 4 fig.1.3 (noting that the $68 billion in 
remittances that flowed out of the United States in 2017 placed it as the country generating the 
largest amount of remittances). 
 27.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-313, REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE 
COUNTRIES: TREASURY SHOULD ASSESS RISKS FROM SHIFTS TO NON-BANKING CHANNELS 1 
(2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-313.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB6T-DNL9] [hereinafter 
GAO REPORT: REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE COUNTRIES]. 
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from purely private activity—wages earned and saved, and money 
banked and wired—as opposed to funds collected in and disbursed 
from federal coffers. Unconstrained by the limits and conditions 
imposed by congressional appropriations as a source of capital, 
remittances grow as the U.S. economy grows.  
Not surprisingly, the difference in scale between remittances and 
foreign aid is stark. Evaluated in absolute dollar amounts, remittances 
that originate within U.S. markets amount to three times the amount 
given through formal aid commitments by the United States.28 Debates 
over remittances have focused on different metrics to evaluate the 
significance of this transnational economy. Of course, the remittance-
to-aid ratio fluctuates from country to country. For certain countries, 
the remittance flow from the United States simply dwarfs the foreign 
aid flow, while other countries have the inverse.29 Moreover, 
remittance streams out of the United States do not flow evenly to 
economies all over the world. Broadly speaking, Mexico, China, India, 
and the Philippines receive more remittances from the United States 
 
 28.  See WORLD BANK GRP., MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK 2016, at 17 
(2016), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23743/9781464803192.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q37P-4GGV] (giving data on remittances compared with other resource flows). 
 29.  Compare Mexico, for which remittances far outpace foreign aid from the United States, 
with Afghanistan, which receives significant aid from the United States but a much lower amount 
in terms of remittance flows. See UNHCR, REMITTANCES 5, 17 (2018), 
https://www.unhcr.org/5b3101d44.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RHL-FHAQ] (explaining that in 2016, 
Afghanistan recorded inbound remittances of about $431 million and Mexico recorded around 
$28 billion); Max Bearak & Lazaro Gamio, The U.S. Foreign Aid Budget, Visualized, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 18, 2016), http://wapo.st/2dy7GHO  [https://perma.cc/7XTE-26SF] (explaining that, in 2016, 
Afghanistan received around $1 billion in U.S. foreign aid and Mexico received around $45 
million). The World Bank releases information on the remittance economy on an annual basis. 
See, e.g., Migration and Remittances Data, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/ 
migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data [https://perma.cc/4ADT-
S5QX] (last updated May 2021). For a useful overview of the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of this dataset, see generally Sandra Paola Alvarez, Pascal Briod, Olivier Ferrari & Ulrike Rieder, 
Remittances: How Reliable Are the Data?, MIGRATION POL’Y PRAC., Apr.–June 2015, at 42. Both 
government agency reports and scholarly contributions routinely cite this data. See GAO 
REPORT: REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 1 n.2 (citing World Bank data 
for remittance statistics); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-65, INTERNATIONAL 
REMITTANCES: MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS AND VIEWS ON ENHANCED CUSTOMER 
VERIFICATION AND RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS 9 n.23 (2016), https://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/gao-16-65.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK6M-LFBQ] [hereinafter GAO REPORT: MONEY 
LAUNDERING RISKS] (citing World Bank data on remittances). See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 
109 n.48 (citing World Bank quantitative data on migration and remittance flows). Given the 
source material, a strong quantitative and economic streak runs through the remittance 
discussions. See generally Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, Do Corrupt Governments Receive 
Less Foreign Aid?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1126 (2002) (conducting a study on the relationship 
between corrupt governments and foreign aid). 
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than any other country, in that order.30 These four countries amount to 
about one-third of all remittances sent worldwide.31 In the context of 
the countries with the greatest remittances flows from the United 
States, consider the degree to which remittance capital outpaces formal 
aid commitments. As Table 1 illustrates, the funds and assets sent to 
these countries as remittances far surpass the aid packages provided by 
U.S. agencies.  
Table 132 
RECEIVING COUNTRY FOREIGN AID REMITTANCES 
Mexico $296 million $30 billion 
China $51 million $16.1 billion 
India $104 million $11.7 billion 
Philippines $167 million $11.1 billion 
 
The top remittance-receiving countries comprise a familiar group 
to immigration scholars and lawyers.33 When examining wait times for 
immigrant visas, these are the same four countries in which demand for 
migration opportunities far exceeds existing supply, as reflected by the 
long wait times for immigrant visas.34 These interconnected and 
 
 30.  See PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 24 (displaying this information in chart form).  
 31.  See Budiman & Connor, supra note 1 (describing the global distribution of remittances 
by region). 
 32.  The federal government makes available information on expenditures sent to other 
countries. All figures include data from fiscal year 2017. The foreign aid data is available at 
foreignassistance.gov. I used the data available for funds that have been “obligated,” which 
reflects funds that a government agency has applied toward some activity or program in the 
recipient country. See MARIAN L. LAWSON & EMILY M. MORGENSTERN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R40213, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 20 (2019), 
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R40213.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW9F-69PQ] (defining “obligations” as 
“amounts contractually committed” towards foreign assistance). The 2017 remittances data is 
available through the World Bank 2017 Bilateral Remittance Matrix as updated in April 2018. 
Migration and Remittances Data, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/ 
migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data [https://perma.cc/F89R-
PVQG]. 2017 is the latest year in which data for both categories is available. Id. 
 33.  See PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 24 (stating that $148 billion in remittances were sent 
from the United States to other countries in 2017). 
 34.  This has been especially true in the context of family-based green card petitions with 
wait times swelling for would-be visa beneficiaries in Mexico and the Philippines. See BUREAU 
OF CONSULAR AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN FOR JUNE 2021, at 1 
(2021), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_june2021.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Z5AR-L3XW]; see also CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., GOING TO THE 
BACK OF THE LINE: A PRIMER ON LINES, VISA CATEGORIES, AND WAIT TIMES 4 (2013), 
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overlapping data points on capital flow and migrant mobility are the 
predictable consequence of migration policies informed by economic 
disparities between the Global North and South, and the historical 
circumstances leading to this resource allocation.  
Looking beyond these four countries, significant remittance 
streams also flow into Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and the 
Dominican Republic.35 These countries have also figured into modern 
immigration policy debates further confirming the close relationship 
between U.S. policy on setting controls over capital outflow and 
migrant inflow.36 The degree to which the economies of different 
countries depend on remittance flows can vary. In terms of gross 
domestic product (“GDP”), remittances comprise 21 percent of El 
Salvador’s GDP, whereas in China, remittances comprise less than 1 
percent of its GDP.37 For obvious reasons, countries like El Salvador 
are vulnerable to fluctuations in remittance streams while other larger 
economies can afford to weather these sorts of swings. 
Beyond these macrotrends of the remittance economy, 
anthropologists and sociologists have deepened our understanding of 
how and on what terms migrants attach social meaning to remittance 
flows.38 Although an important, standalone body of remittances 
scholarship exists, the broader literature on migration studies also 
provides helpful insights on the meaning of remittances.39 Together, 
this scholarship confirms that the remittance market arises within the 
 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/CIRbrief-BackofLine.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZA6E-N46G] (noting the long wait times for visa applicants from Mexico, the 
Philippines, China, and India); BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., supra note 11 (listing the wait 
times for Mexico, the Philippines, China, and India separately from bulk of applications). 
 35.  See PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 24. 
 36.  See generally Sarkar, supra note 7, at 806–08 (explaining that legal controls over capital 
affect the movement of migrants across borders at both the international and state levels).  
 37.  See Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) – El Salvador, Philippines, China, 
India, Mexico, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD. 
ZS?locations=SV-PH-CN-IN-MX [https://perma.cc/242N-F7XW]. Of the “big four” remittance-
receiving countries, the greatest impact of remittances as measured by GDP is the Philippines for 
which remittances comprise 9.7 percent. Id. 
 38.  For a good sampling of an anthropological analysis of the remittance economy binding 
the United States to other countries, see generally THAI, supra note 20 (retelling the stories of 
various Vietnamese migrants and the role remittances and money generally played in their 
experiences) and Coutin, supra note 22 (same, but with the stories of migrants from El Salvador).  
 39.  This is not surprising given that a core reason why many migrants seek out opportunities 
to come to the United States and other developed nations is to work for the purpose of remitting 
some portion of their wages to loved ones. See LAUREN HEIDBRINK, MIGRANTHOOD: YOUTH IN 
A NEW ERA OF DEPORTATION 44–47 (2020); PARREÑAS, supra note 19, at 53–54. 
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context of transnational families—that is, families in which different 
members live in different countries.  
For this reason, the decision to migrate is often the product of a 
collective decision-making process. The journey to the United States is 
costly—both in economic terms and increasingly in terms of human 
life—so a would-be migrant often must ask family and community 
members to pool resources to invest in a migrant.40 Both lawful 
channels like temporary work visas41 or unlawful channels like 
surreptitious entry into the United States require significant 
expenditures. And if saving and sharing resources cannot cover the 
costs, families can take out loans to cover the rest. This decisionmaking 
process can be complicated. While there might be a consensus within a 
family over who should be the one to embark for the United States, 
migration opportunities can be a precious resource to which many in a 
family might want to lay claim. Decisions to fund a family member’s 
journey to the United States can unfold the same way they do at 
American dinner tables—awkwardly, angrily, intensely, and 
sometimes leading to resentment even if the underlying motivation 
behind these migration decisions is a sense of familial love.42  
In this context, remittances function as a form of support for 
family members.43 This money transfer can be used for a variety of 
ends: to invest in human capital, such as by helping to pay for a family 
member’s education;44 to start a business by providing seed money; or, 
in many instances, to enable remittance recipients to meet their basic 
consumption needs.45 Remittances also provide other less obvious but 
 
 40.  See FILIZ GARIP, ON THE MOVE: CHANGING MECHANISMS OF MEXICO-U.S. 
MIGRATION 68–71 (2017). 
 41.  See Jennifer Gordon, Regulating the Human Supply Chain, 102 IOWA L. REV. 445, 460–
68 (2017) (providing an overview of the various costs and fees associated with applying for a 
temporary work visa).  
 42.  See, e.g., GARIP, supra note 40, at 68–70. 
 43.  See, e.g., Ester Hernandez & Susan Bibler Coutin, Remitting Subjects: Migrants, Money, 
and States, 35 ECON. & SOC’Y 185, 190 (2006); Menjívar et al., supra note 6, at 98; Bernard Poirine, 
A Theory of Remittances as an Implicit Family Loan Arrangement, 25 WORLD DEV. 589, 598 
(1997). Note that another strain of the literature characterizes remittances as acts of altruism, 
which do not necessarily benefit family members. See generally Adelman, supra note 5 (analyzing 
remittances as a type of foreign aid that reduces poverty in poorer countries). 
 44.  See Lauren Heidbrink, Circulation of Care Among Unaccompanied Migrant Youth from 
Guatemala, 92 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 30, 35 (2018). 
 45.  See Jorge Durand, Emilio A. Parrado & Douglas S. Massey, Migradollars and 
Development: A Reconsideration of the Mexican Case, 30 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 423, 426 (1996). 
One longstanding criticism of remittances has been that they do not always or even often offer 
much return on investments in human capital because recipients are free to use remittance income 
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no less important secondary benefits, such as access to microloans and 
other financial services.46 Specifically, a steady flow of remittance 
income can help remittance recipients demonstrate “credit 
worthiness” in local lending markets.47 Thus, remittances both directly 
and indirectly help alleviate poverty, and to a certain extent, foster 
development in receiving countries.48  
All of this points to the insight that remittances function as an 
economic affirmation of familial bonds. Sometimes, scholarly and 
popular accounts describe this family-affirming dimension to 
remittances in self-serving terms, in which remittances function as a 
kind of repayment for implicit loans made to migrants by their family 
members.49 In exchange for supporting family members, remitters 
receive goodwill and enhanced community standing. Popular accounts 
portray remitters as occupying a position of respect and high standing 
in remittance receiving countries. In describing migrants who send 
remittances to Mexico, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador described them as “living heroes.”50 In this way, the familial 
bonds that cut across transnational boundaries remain dynamic and 
emotionally fulfilling. As an economic transaction that reaffirms 
familial identities, remittances are subject to market constraints in 
 
on imported consumer goods, which undercuts job creation in local economies. See Charles B. 
Keely & Bao Nga Tran, Remittances from Labor Migration: Evaluations, Performance and 
Implications, 23 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 500, 502 (1989).  
 46.  See AUDREY SINGER & ANNA PAULSON, FINANCIAL ACCESS FOR IMMIGRANTS: 
LEARNING FROM DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES 1–2, 7 (2004), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/cr19.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJD9-NRKD]. 
 47.  See Maryann Bylander, The Growing Linkages Between Migration and Microfinance, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 13, 2013), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/growing-
linkages-between-migration-and-microfinance [https://perma.cc/3LAR-97KE]. 
 48.  See DILIP RATHA, THE IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
POVERTY REDUCTION 5–6 (2013), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Remittances-
PovertyReduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9QP-48HQ] (stating that remittances represent a major 
vehicle for reducing the scale and severity of poverty in the developing world); see also Peter 
Gammeltoft, Remittances and Other Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 40 INT’L 
MIGRATION 181, 190 (2002) (discussing remittances as a development resource). 
 49.  See Poirine, supra note 43, at 593 (describing “[e]nforcement of the implicit loan 
contract”). 
 50.  Guzman, supra note 4. This is a common description across countries. See Eric J. Pido, 
Balikbayan Paranoia: Tourism Development in Manila and the Anxiety of Return, in SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN DIASPORA IN THE UNITED STATES: MEMORIES AND VISIONS, YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND 
TOMORROW 31, 33–34 (Jonathan H. X. Lee ed., 2014); see also Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, 
Transgressing the Nation-State: The Partial Citizenship and “Imagined (Global) Community” of 
Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers, in GENDERED CITIZENSHIPS: TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION, POLITICAL ACTIVISM, AND CULTURE 98 (Kia 
Lilly Caldwell et al. eds., 2009).  
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ways that noneconomic expressions are not. Unlike words of 
affirmation or endearing text messages, economic expressions like 
remittances can dry up as labor markets shrink or shift and remitters 
lose work. And while remitters can find other ways to remain 
connected with family members, those family members who had 
counted on remittance flows still have economic needs to meet and 
debts to pay off.51  
Other times, remittances are portrayed as economic expressions 
of affinity between family members, emotional affirmations free of 
market logics. In this account, the decisions related to migrating, 
accessing work, and remitting wages all comprise parts of a larger effort 
to support one’s family. In her ethnographic work on migrant youth in 
Guatemala, Professor Lauren Heidbrink observes that family 
members who remain behind in remittance-receiving countries might 
see migration as an “act of love.”52 In this context, remittances “are not 
anonymized financial transfers; they are infused with care and 
commitment to . . . family. They have a face.”53 Similarly, in her study 
of Salvadoran migrants, sociologist Leisy Abrego found that her 
interviewees were often driven by desperation to provide for their 
families who were living on the brink of poverty.54  
None of this should be taken to foster an idealized vision of family 
connection. These monetary transfers unfold across a range of 
economic circumstances. In many cases, remitted funds represent more 
than an electronic version of a hug or an encouraging pat on the back. 
They also represent the economic culmination of a journey beset with 
violence and long-term trauma for the remitter and a crucial financial 
 
 51.  Often times, migrants take out loans to fund a single family member’s journey to the 
United States and the failure to repay those loans can have severe economic consequences for 
those still living in the remittance-receiving country. See Lauren Heidbrink, The Coercive Power 
of Debt: Migration and Deportation of Guatemalan Indigenous Youth, 24 J. LATIN AM. & 
CARIBBEAN ANTHROPOLOGY 263, 272 (2019) (noting that moneylenders in migration sending 
countries sometimes confiscate land for defaulted loan payments). Remittances, like any kind of 
valuable resource, can generate family strife, especially as family members suspect that remitters 
are saving more of their wage earnings for themselves than for remitting. In this context, shaming 
and guilt-tripping are common and probably similar to the kinds of behavior that arise within 
native-born U.S. households in the face of financial disputes. See LEISY J. ABREGO, SACRIFICING 
FAMILIES: NAVIGATING LAWS, LABOR, AND LOVE ACROSS BORDERS 60 (2014) (recounting the 
experiences of a migrant who felt motivated to repay debts to avoid intrafamily tension). 
 52.  HEIDBRINK, supra note 39, at 43.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See ABREGO, supra note 51, at 26. 
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cushion against poverty and its associated economic and physical 
vulnerability.55 For some, remittances are equal parts love and survival. 
Both popular and scholarly accounts of migrants often paint them 
as motivated by a desire to access U.S. labor markets, the wage 
earnings from which prop up the transnational remittance market. And 
of course, this is true—to some extent. At the same time, migrants may 
feel compelled to provide remittances for reasons that arise after 
making the decision to journey into the United States for unrelated 
reasons. Disasters may strike different parts of the globe, causing those 
in the United States with endangered family members to send 
monetary relief. Using El Salvador as an example, many unauthorized 
migrants in the United States were able to secure a form of immigration 
relief through the Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) program, 
which was a humanitarian response to the earthquake in El Salvador 
in 2001.56 This relief maintained or improved the work opportunities 
available to Salvadoran migrants, which in turn enabled them to send 
some of their wage earnings to their family members coping with the 
disaster.57 In other words, programs like TPS both directly stabilize 
migrant opportunities in the United States as well as indirectly foster 
support for regions affected by a qualifying disaster. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, while it is easy to fixate on 
those remittances that are money transfers via banks and other 
financial institutions, remittances can also be shared in person. Much 
of the joy in giving support to family members comes from the human 
connection fostered by gifts, be they cash in an envelope or paying for 
a meal together. But remittances of this variety are mostly limited to 
migrants with lawful status who have the ability to move freely across 
borders. Migrants without lawful status or with temporary or 
contingent forms of status like TPS generally cannot foster 
relationships through traditional means of physical connectedness, like 
spontaneous visits to say hello and planned visits to celebrate life 
events.58 For migrants who face greater constraints in their mobility, 
 
 55.  See id. at 52.  
 56.  See Hernandez & Coutin, supra note 43, at 191.  
 57.  This is one of the reasons that remittance flows are theorized as a countercyclical 
phenomenon: flows increase as the economies of remittance-receiving communities shrink. See 
Rosser, supra note 7, at 17 (“[E]ven where the shock is purely economic, there is the strong 
possibility that remittances are counter-cyclical, providing additional resources when the home 
country’s economy is not doing well.”). 
 58.  Of course, technological advances like video calls also help maintain connections. See 
HEIDBRINK, supra note 39, at 49. 
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remittances via wire transfers remain the most viable method of 
showing economic support to their family members abroad.59 Thus, for 
the undocumented community, remittances allow migrants to maintain 
an “absent presence” overseas in the businesses they help fund and 
through the clothes and food their family members purchase.60 
II.  REMITTANCES IN A WORLD OF REDUCED MIGRANT MOBILITY 
Legal scholarship on the remittance economy has tended to focus 
on bilateral or multilateral legal arrangements grounding debates 
within the context of tax law and policy.61 This Part highlights a 
different set of domestic laws that regulate remittances, namely anti-
money laundering laws. Drawing from criminal law and national 
security legal traditions, these financial controls shape the kinds of 
banks and financial institutions that are available to remitters in the 
United States.  
Centering the role that these laws play in shaping remittance 
markets situates the remittances discussion within the economic and 
legal realities most applicable to unauthorized migrants who have 
resided in the United States for years and who often do not enjoy the 
freedom of movement across borders. Thus, while remittances can be 
construed to account for both transfers that happen through banks and 
financial institutions as well as gifts and payments that happen in 
person,62 for migrants with unlawful or tenuous legal statuses, bank-
facilitated money transfers remain the only meaningful version of this 
form of connection. Given that migrants frequently remain separated 
from family members across borders for years and sometimes 
decades,63 remittances offer an important alternative to physical 
togetherness for reaffirming familial relationships.  
 
 59.  In some situations, remitters can pay couriers to physically carry money and gifts into 
countries on their behalf. See GAO REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS, supra note 29, at 9–
10; see also 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (detailing reporting requirements for those carrying more than 
ten thousand dollars into or out of the United States). 
 60.  Hernandez & Coutin, supra note 43, at 202.  
 61.  See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 7, at 103–19; Rosser, supra note 7, at 28–41.  
 62.  Anti-money laundering laws regulate in-person transfers by requiring travelers to 
declare any amount of money in possession greater than ten thousand dollars. See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5316(a)(1); FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FINCEN FORM 105, REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION OF CURRENCY OR MONETARY INSTRUMENTS (2017).  
 63.  See Lee, supra note 17, at 2336–54, 2372. 
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A. Anti-Money Laundering Laws and their Regulators 
In the broadest of terms, the statutory framework undergirding 
modern anti-money laundering policies developed at three distinct 
moments. The origin story begins in the 1970s, as Congress began 
focusing on the cover the financial system provided for drug dealers 
and others who profited from illicit activities.64 Most notably, the Bank 
Secrecy Act of 1970 (“BSA”) imposes recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements on financial institutions as a way of preventing banks 
from benefiting from the drug trade.65  
A second key piece of legislation came in the 1980s in which 
Congress began intensifying the penalties related to BSA 
recordkeeping requirements. In 1986, Congress passed the Money 
Laundering Control Act (“MLCA”), which criminalizes the act of 
money laundering, with penalties in the forms of fines or imprisonment 
for banks and other financial institutions complicit in the drug trade.66 
The MLCA not only targeted banks for their role in facilitating money 
laundering, it also enlisted the banks’ help in identifying suspicious 
transactions that could be covering up or facilitating dangerous 
behavior related to organized crime such as drug trafficking.67 
Finally, the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act further expands regulatory 
powers by imposing greater obligations on financial institutions to 
collect information on their customers and clients.68 The existing 
infrastructure was geared toward identifying “dirty” money that had 
been commingled with legitimate funds. The PATRIOT Act added 
new legal programs and goals designed to ferret out terrorist activity, 
which presented a slightly different challenge. Money laundering 
typically involves attempting to conceal unlawful criminal activity that 
 
 64.  Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
797, 859 (2016). 
 65.  Banks are required to report to agencies significant currency deposits, exchanges, or 
withdrawals. See id.; see also Peter E. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money from Reaching the Wash 
Cycle: A Guide to the Bank Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING L.J. 230, 232–35 (1991) (reviewing key 
provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act that are intended to thwart money laundering).  
 66.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). 
 67.  See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 861 (describing the MLCA approach to anti-
money laundering policy as “regulators [relying] on financial institutions as reputational 
intermediaries, requiring them to turn away potential money launderers, or face heavy 
sanctions”);  see also David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 1359, 1409–10 (2007) (describing anti-money laundering policies as a system that requires 
banks and other financial institutions to report to the Treasury Department “suspicious 
transactions”). 
 68.  See 31 U.S.C. § 5318. 
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has already transpired for the purpose of washing away the money’s 
criminal origins. By contrast, terrorist financing often involves money 
with lawful origins being put toward unlawful and dangerous ends, like 
terrorism. For example, wages that were lawfully earned and then 
donated to a charity that turned out to be a cover for terrorist financing 
did not obviously violate anti-money laundering laws at least as to the 
donor.69 Against this backdrop, the PATRIOT Act requires banks and 
other financial institutions to create and implement customer 
identification programs—that is, to require banks to verify the 
identities of anyone opening an account.70 The PATRIOT Act also 
requires banks to report any “suspicious activity,” including larger 
financial transactions.71  
In targeting transnational financial activity, these policies 
empowered a mix of public and private actors to carry out the fight 
against dangerous activity supported and obfuscated by financial 
institutions. The U.S. Department of the Treasury bears primary 
responsibility for regulating remittance flows. Within the Treasury, the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) sets policy 
related to preventing money laundering and the financing of crimes 
and terrorist activity through the financial system.72 The Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), also within Treasury, enforces 
economic and trade sanctions against foreign countries and other 
entities, which can include stopping or capping remittance flows into 
countries on the sanctions list.73 Both FinCEN and OFAC enjoy wide 
 
 69.  William Vlcek, A Leviathan Rejuvenated: Surveillance, Money Laundering, and the War 
on Terror, 20 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 21, 25 (2008). 
 70.  See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1412.  
 71.  APPLESEED, EXPANDING IMMIGRANT ACCESS TO MAINSTREAM FINANCIAL 
SERVICES: POSITIVE PRACTICES AND EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN 
IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE 40–43 (2006), https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/100-
FinancialServices-ReportExpandImmigrantAccesstoServices.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MVV-
68GQ]; ANNA PAULSON, AUDREY SINGER, ROBIN NEWBERGER & JEREMY SMITH, FED. RSRV. 
BANK OF CHI. & THE BROOKINGS INST., FINANCIAL ACCESS TO IMMIGRANTS: LESSONS FROM 
DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES 35 (2006), https://www.chicagofed.org/region/community-
development/financial-access-for-immigrants [https://perma.cc/99ME-2CJV].  
 72.  What We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do 
[https://perma.cc/85K6-SCAE]. 
 73.  Office of Foreign Assets Control – Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-control-
sanctions-programs-and-information [https://perma.cc/Y742-LDBK].  
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latitude and discretion in policy setting and pursuing enforcement 
targets.74  
Other agencies also regulate financial institutions that process 
remittances, but their missions differ from those lodged in Treasury. 
Most notably, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau targets 
remittance transfer companies engaging in predatory economic 
practices.75 But what distinguishes FinCEN and OFAC is how their 
policies are embedded within broader criminal law enforcement and 
antiterrorist legal structures. Regulators can use violations of FinCEN 
rules as the basis of criminal prosecutions instead of having to settle for 
less punitive outcomes in civil administrative proceedings.76 And the 
OFAC sanctions list is meant to punish foreign countries and entities 
who tolerate or harbor terrorist activity.77 This means that as a general 
matter, FinCEN and OFAC enjoy a greater degree of freedom from 
judicial review and public monitoring.  
Finally, in certain instances, the president himself can freeze assets 
or disrupt financial transactions through power created through 
national security laws.78 The International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (“IEEPA”) authorizes the president to freeze the assets of 
individuals and groups that provide financial support to or otherwise 
assist acts of terrorism79 on a finding of “any unusual or extraordinary 
 
 74.  For example, the lack of transparency and judicial review surrounding “terrorist” 
designations gives agencies like OFAC broad discretion to freeze assets of organizations with 
putative ties to terrorist organizations even before an investigation concludes. See Zaring & 
Baylis, supra note 70, at 1402–03 (discussing instances where OFAC froze the assets of various 
Islamic charities). 
 75.  Specifically, Congress directed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to ensure 
that the terms and conditions surrounding these services are transparent and accessible to 
remitters. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(c). Among other things, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1073, 124 Stat. 1376, 2060 (2010). 
 76.  See BSA Records “Critical” in Conviction of Money Launderer in Organized Retail Theft 
Case, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement/case-
examples/bsa-records-critical-conviction-money-launderer-organized [https://perma.cc/9PH6-
ESST].  
 77.  See Press Release, The United States Department of Justice, Standard Chartered Bank 
Agrees To Forfeit $227 Million for Illegal Transactions with Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Burma (Dec. 
10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/standard-chartered-bank-agrees-forfeit-227-million-
illegal-transactions-iran-sudan-libya-and [https://perma.cc/L48B-DUFC].  
 78.  See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. § 4305; National Emergencies 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651); International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified in scattered 
sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 79.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1702. 
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threat . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the 
United States.”80 Initially used to address threats posed by foreign 
states and their governments, over time, presidents began evoking 
IEEPA to address threats posed by nongovernmental entities like 
terrorists and terrorist organizations.81 In the days following the 
September 11 attack, President Bush invoked his powers delegated to 
him under IEEPA to roll out an initial response to the attack.82 This 
paved the way for Congress to formally recognize the president’s 
authority in this context through the PATRIOT Act, which expanded 
on the basic infrastructure IEEPA created and President Bush 
invoked.83  
B. Gatekeepers in the Anti-money Laundering System 
In trying to craft laws that could address extraordinary threats to 
the public security of the United States, lawmakers and regulators 
developed approaches that not only targeted noncitizens and foreign-
born individuals, but also enlisted the help of those well-positioned to 
profit from the targeted behavior. These laws coerce both private 
actors and intermediaries. 
In the context of financing criminal and terrorist activity, financial 
institutions such as banks play a key part in sheltering these illicit 
activities. Federal regulators rely on banks to identify potentially 
unlawful banking activity through their access to the banking activity 
of broad cross sections of the economy.84 These laws also impose 
recordkeeping obligations on businesses that are meant to deter them 
from shirking their duty to monitor for suspicious activity.85 Most 
notably, the BSA requires firms to keep records and submit reports 
pertaining to activity deemed to be useful to a variety of legal matters 
including those that affect terrorism.86 The PATRIOT Act not only 
 
 80.  See id. § 1701(a); see also CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, IAN F. FERGUSSON, DIANNE E. 
RENNACK & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 10 (2020), 
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7YG-F78X]. 
 81.  See CASEY ET AL., supra note 80, at 21–22. 
 82.  See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 31 C.F.R. 786 (2002). 
 83.  See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1395. 
 84.  See Rachel Ratliff, Third-Party Money Laundering: Problems of Proof and Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 173 (1995). 
 85.  See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 860.  
 86.  See id. at 871. At some later date, if a criminal is charged with engaging in drug sales, 
bank records showing that members of the criminal organization were making frequent deposits 
in small amounts can help prosecutors build their case. See Meltzer, supra note 65, at 233–34; see 
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reorients financial regulatory tools to account for antiterrorist goals, 
but it also significantly expands the types of financial institutions 
subject to monitoring and reporting requirements. In addition to 
national banks, the new requirements cover credit unions, 
pawnbrokers, and hawalas87—basically any entity engaged in the 
business of lending money no matter how minimal or informal.88 All of 
these covered entities are obligated to file Suspicious Activity Reports 
with the Treasury Department.89  
As mentioned earlier, 1986 was a turning point for the regulation 
of capital flows when Congress passed the MLCA. That same year, 
Congress passed, and the president signed into law, the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”). This was a major 
legislative achievement, one that commentators sometimes invoke as a 
potential guide to navigating the difficult political terrain that elected 
officials face today in achieving immigration reform.90 IRCA amended 
the immigration code to impose a set of verification duties onto firms 
to ensure that they do not hire unauthorized migrants—that is, to 
reserve job opportunities in the formal economy for U.S. citizens, 
 
also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money 
Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 351 
(2003) (describing the process by which money laundering crimes are prosecuted). The 
PATRIOT Act expanded the BSA framework to cover laundering crimes related to terrorist 
activity. The BSA prohibits, among other things, using financial transactions to conceal “the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The statute, in turn, defines 
“specified unlawful activity” to include various terrorism-related offenses. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(D); 
see also Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1410–11 (describing the different ways that the 
PATRIOT Act amended the BSA to allow regulators to punish money launderers for harmful 
acts related to terrorism). 
 87.  “Hawala” refers to informal money transfer systems organized around familial 
relationships and regional affiliations. See GAO REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS, supra 
note 29, at 9–10. Hawala originated within the Islamic and Arab economic context. See generally 
Matthias Schramm & Markus Taube, Evolution and Institutional Foundation of the Hawala 
Financial System, 12 INT’L REV. OF FIN. ANALYSIS 405, 406–07 (2003) (explaining how “the 
hawala system established itself as an efficient institutional arrangement” for “coordinating 
economic interaction” in the Near and Middle East). While different regions employ similar 
alternative remittance systems, the U.S. remittances literatures often uses hawala as shorthand to 
capture all of these alternative systems. See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL FLOWS 
FROM HUMAN TRAFFICKING 56 (2018), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/ 
Human-Trafficking-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FGJ-ARVZ] (describing a British company’s 
efforts to launder profits through the use of “local hawala bankers”). 
 88.  See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1411. 
 89.  See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 807, 869–70; Cuéllar, supra note 86, at 358. 
 90.  See, e.g., Nicole Narea, What a Reagan-era Law Can Teach Democrats About Legalizing 
Undocumented Immigrants, VOX (July 4, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/22557613 [https://perma.cc/779H-XCRD]. 
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green card holders, and other legal insiders.91 IRCA also requires firms 
to begin keeping records, and in some cases, requires firms to submit a 
worker’s information to federal agencies for verification.92  
Both the MLCA and IRCA were legal intermediation strategies 
designed to dry up opportunities for funding and work by leveraging 
the United States’ massive global economic influence to deter the 
proliferation of undesirable behavior. Pursuant to this logic, disrupting 
cash flow can create structural consequences for criminal organizations 
in ways that seizing profits or arresting low-level criminals cannot.93 In 
the case of money laundering, the goal is to undermine terrorist or 
criminal activity; in the case of migration, the goal is to deter 
unauthorized migration for anti-humanitarian reasons.  
The two laws share many features. First, like the MLCA, IRCA 
imposes law enforcement duties on private intermediaries. MLCA 
targets banks and other financial institutions while IRCA targets 
employers and labor recruiters.94 Second, just as the MLCA imposes 
criminal penalties on banks that refuse to carry out recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements in good faith,95 IRCA similarly imposes 
criminal penalties on employers and recruiters who knowingly hire 
unauthorized migrants.96 Third, just as the MLCA has been criticized 
for being narrowly construed to permit banks to avoid the most 
punitive aspects of the law,97 IRCA has been similarly criticized for not 
penalizing employers even where the facts strongly suggest that they 
had reason to believe that their workers were unauthorized.98 Finally, 
both regimes have been subject to criticism on the grounds of capture, 
with prosecutors and agency officials rarely mustering up the resources 
 
 91.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)–(b); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the 
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1112 (2009) [hereinafter Lee, Private Immigration Screening]. 
 92.  See Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting To Work: Why Nobody Cares About E-Verify (and Why 
They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381, 391–92 (2012).  
 93.  See Mark Osler, Asset Forfeiture in a New Market-Reality Narcotics Policy, 52 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 221, 228–29 (2015). 
 94.  Lee, Private Immigration Screening, supra note 91, at 1110–13. 
 95.  Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 861.  
 96.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(4), (f)(1). 
 97.  See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 861–62. 
 98.  See Lee, Private Immigration Screening, supra note 91, at 1119–25; Kitty Calavita, 
Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1061–64 (1990). 
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or will to target high-level criminals, and opting instead to target low-
hanging fruit.99 
Indeed, during the 1980s, legal scholars described anti-money 
laundering and antimigration laws as fitting within the same category 
of regulatory challenge. As Congress was considering whether to enlist 
the help of banks and employers in the fight against criminal economic 
activities, legal scholars began taking on questions related to 
gatekeeper liability. Put simply, gatekeeper liability sought to target 
not just bad actors, but also private parties whose cooperation is 
necessary for the commission of bad acts. Professor Reinier H. 
Kraakman’s work on gatekeeping from the mid-1980s has proven to be 
especially influential within the gatekeeping literature.100 Much of this 
scholarship focuses on gatekeeping in the context of corporate 
governance,101 but this idea eventually propped up scholarly inquiries 
in parallel arenas, including for banks engaging in anti-money 
laundering efforts102 and for lawyers advising firms.103 Importantly, 
early iterations of gatekeeping scholarship also recognized the 
gatekeeping’s applicability to immigration enforcement. Listing 
examples to develop his idea of gatekeeping in a well-known 1986 
article, Kraakman points to employer liability for hiring unauthorized 
immigrants, which at the time was an idea embedded in a bill that 
would become IRCA.104 
 
 99.  See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The 
Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 209–11; Cuéllar, supra note 86, at 405–11.  
 100.  See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 61–66 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers] (describing gatekeeper liability); see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability 
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 92 YALE L.J. 857, 888–97 (1984) (discussing gatekeeper 
liability in the corporate context).  
 101.  See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1707–08 (1985). This work also spilled over into other related areas such as 
tax regulation. See Ann Southworth, Redefining the Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 889, 890–91 (1985); Alan L. Feld, Fairness in Rate Cuts in the Individual Income 
Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 429, 430 (1983). 
 102.  See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 8003.  
 103.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Gatekeepers, Cultural Captives, or Knaves?: Corporate 
Lawyers Through Different Lenses, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1686 (2020). 
 104.  In the article, Kraakman notes that employers would become gatekeepers “if they were 
required to exclude undocumented aliens,” and then cites the 1983 Simpson-Mazzoli Act, which 
eventually became the foundation for the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. See 
Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 100, at 64. For a modern application of the gatekeeping 
concept to employers and unauthorized migrants, see Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of 
Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 892–93. 
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These legal tools, which foist onto private actors a degree of 
responsibility over public-like duties, illustrate how such programs can 
function in ways that are simultaneously coercive and empowering. 
These laws are coercive in the sense that Congress and the relevant 
agencies can punish employers, banks, and other intermediaries for 
failing to keep records and to report suspicious activity. The 
enforcement can be arbitrary both across and within administrations.105 
And over time, enforcement decisions motivated or shaped by 
arbitrariness or bias drain the obligations’ legitimacy.106 
At the same time, the laws also empower firms and banks to make 
judgment calls, thereby creating broad pockets of discrimination for 
the private actors charged with these legal obligations.107 The standards 
governing these duties can be vague and hard to meet and the 
regulatory landscape can be vast, lowering the likelihood of audit and 
inspection, which in turn leaves intermediaries with the flexibility and 
discretion to act in self-serving ways. Large banks with a significant 
transnational presence might have sufficient resources to cultivate in-
house expertise on complying with anti-money laundering 
requirements, but a smaller credit union might turn a blind eye to 
customers engaging in “red flag” activity.108  
C. Blocking and Narrowing 
Anti-money laundering laws formally empower regulators and 
law enforcement officials and functionally deputize banks and financial 
institutions to identify and separate those financial transactions meant 
to facilitate or support criminal and terrorist activity from those that 
 
 105.  See Cheryl R. Lee, Constitutional Cash: Are Banks Guilty of Racial Profiling in 
Implementing the United States Patriot Act?, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 557, 587–91 (2006) 
[hereinafter Lee, Constitutional Cash] (suggesting that banks have engaged in discriminatory 
behavior in implementing monitoring policies); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch 
Between State Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 15, 49–50 (2004) [hereinafter Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State 
Capacity] (noting the potentially perverse effects created by enforcement choices made by 
regulators). For a useful overview of the various administrative difficulties related to 
implementing anti-money laundering policies, see Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1394–1418. 
 106.  See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1979–80 (2008). 
 107.  For a helpful account on the equity implications of banking laws and regulations, see 
generally BARADARAN, supra note 9 (detailing the different banking system experienced by 
impoverished Americans). 
 108.  See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (requiring financial institutions to develop anti-money 
laundering programs); see also Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 882–83 (noting that J.P. 
Morgan has eight thousand employees working on anti-money laundering issues while smaller 
banks will likely have fewer than ten people devoted to these issues). 
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advance legitimate purposes like supporting family members in other 
countries. The broad and sweeping nature of anti-money laundering 
laws often leaves remitters with little recourse when remittance 
corridors narrow or disappear.  
In a common scenario, a remitter deposits money into an account 
of a bank that has a transnational presence, which allows recipients to 
access those funds at a bank branch in the recipient’s country of 
residence. This is ideal in terms of ease and costs of access to 
remittances. In a less ideal but still common scenario, a remitter might 
still use a bank for initiating the remittance transfer, but the intended 
recipient does not have access to the same bank in the recipient’s 
country. Accordingly, a United States-based bank must wire the money 
through sending services that can transfer that money to a bank that 
the recipient can access.109 In one final scenario, a remitter may decide 
to bypass banks altogether and simply wire the funds through a money 
transfer organization like Western Union.  
Anti-money laundering policies can disrupt remittance flows in 
two ways. The first and most extreme disruption involves the outright 
prohibition of the transfer of money through financial institutions. 
Residents of countries subject to OFAC sanctions, for example, have 
few options in receiving remittances from the United States.110 
Remitters in the United States interested in transferring money to 
residents of sanctioned countries must navigate a kaleidoscope of 
restrictions. Sometimes remitters are subject to a transfer cap (as is the 
case for remittances to Cuba).111 At other times, the restriction 
regulates the type of remittance. Transfers to individuals might be 
permissible while transfers to charitable organizations would not be—
at least not without procuring a license to do so (as is the case for 
remittances to Iran).112 And where OFAC permits remittances, it 
 
 109.  See GAO REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS, supra note 29, at 6–7. 
 110.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-297, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: 
FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES FOR VIOLATIONS OF FINANCIAL CRIMES AND 
SANCTIONS REQUIREMENTS 16–18 (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-297.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MF3K-WAHC]; Sanctions Programs and Country Information, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-
and-country-information [https://perma.cc/R9YF-YUSR].  
 111.  See 31 C.F.R. § 515.570(a)(1) (2019). 
 112.  See 31 C.F.R. § 560.550(b) (2020); see also 31 C.F.R. § 510.511(2) (2020) (imposing 
similar restrictions on remittances to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). 
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usually requires remitters to use a pre-approved entity to facilitate the 
transfer (as is the case for remittances to Syria).113  
The bottom line is that OFAC reduces remittance flows to a 
trickle for countries on the sanctions list. A blunt regulatory tool, 
sanctions certainly raise the costs for terrorists interested in pooling 
donations and payments to fund their illicit and dangerous activity, but 
such restrictions also leave members of those countries even more 
vulnerable in terms of economic security.114 It is also unclear whether 
such policies actually deter the financing of terrorism, or whether it 
simply pushes such funding activities into other channels that do not as 
easily lend themselves to monitoring, such as courier services and the 
physical transfer of funds.115  
Anti-money laundering policies affect remittance streams in a 
second, less direct, but more broadly applicable way. Beyond the 
blanket prohibitions that federal regulators like OFAC impose, the 
broad reach of the policies also generate uncertainty and confusion for 
banks in deciding which types of financial transactions trigger a 
reporting obligation. Instead of bearing the costs of recordkeeping, 
suspending, and then reactivating bank accounts after investigation 
and reporting suspicious activity, banks can simply decide to avoid 
these costs altogether by closing individual accounts, and in some cases, 
entire branches. This process of “derisking” involves banks cutting ties 
with certain types of customers and clients to avoid the costs associated 
with regulatory scrutiny.116 In other words, a bank may simply decide 
that maintaining risky customer accounts may not justify the associated 
benefits and therefore decide to close those accounts.  
This strategy helps banks mitigate risk, but it imposes social costs 
by barring customers with legitimate banking needs who happen to fit 
the profile of a risky client. Repeated and relatively modest deposits 
from various locations in the United States to a common beneficiary 
reflects economic activity that is consistent with human trafficking or 
 
 113.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL LICENSE NO. 6, NONCOMMERCIAL, 
PERSONAL REMITTANCES AUTHORIZED (2011), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ 
syria_gl6.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD2Y-563G].  
 114.  See Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering 
Regimes, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 45, 69–70 (2002). 
 115.  See GAO REPORT: REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 1–3.  
 116.  See Christina Parajon Skinner, Executive Liability for Anti-Money Laundering Controls, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2016). 
LEE IN FINAL CHECK (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2021  3:08 PM 
2022] ECONOMICS AND FAMILY SEPARATION 871 
other criminal behavior,117 but such activity is also consistent with the 
remittance activities of a seasonal migrant worker attempting to help 
pay for a family member’s funeral in Mexico.118 In some instances, 
larger banks have taken aggressive risk-management strategies such as 
shutting down branches in regions associated with high-risk money 
laundering practices.119 Finally, banks also close accounts for firms, not 
just individuals. In particular, banks might want to avoid tarnishing 
their brand by associating with money transfer organizations that have 
attracted scrutiny or that have been penalized for facilitating criminal 
activities.120 
The disruptions caused by anti-money laundering policies can 
exacerbate inequality in at least three respects. The first has to do with 
unequal treatment built into immigration status differentials. As noted 
earlier, although remittances can be shared during return visits for 
many migrants, that is unrealistic. Individuals who travel outside of the 
United States can deliver cash, dole out trendy commodities, and pay 
for luxurious experiences for family members in person.121 But 
immigration enforcement or antimigration policies make it harder for 
migrants to move freely across borders. In a world of reduced mobility, 
remitters are more heavily dependent upon the availability of financial 
institutions for money transfers.  
 
 117.  See FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-A008, 
GUIDANCE ON RECOGNIZING ACTIVITY THAT MAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH HUMAN 
SMUGGLING AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING—FINANCIAL RED FLAGS app. A (2014), 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/FIN-2014-A008.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6UJ-
PMLF]. 
 118.  See Heidbrink, supra note 51, at 273; see also Peter Benson, El Campo: Faciality and 
Structural Violence in Farm Labor Camps, 23 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 589, 606 (2008) 
(describing the life of a seasonal migrant worker, including remittance activities). 
 119.  See, e.g., David Garrick, Border Banks Closures Prompting Feds To Review Money-
Laundering Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 27, 2018, 7:40 PM), https:// 
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/border-baja-california/sd-me-border-banks-20180227-
story.html [https://perma.cc/49YL-UHBT]; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-
18-213, COMMUNITY BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS: REGULATORS COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL 
STEPS TO ADDRESS COMPLIANCE BURDENS 1–2 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-
213.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG5Z-QXT9] (discussing the regulatory concerns that led banks to 
begin derisking).  
 120.  See Press Release, The United States Department of Justice, Moneygram International 
Inc. Admits Anti-Money Laundering and Wire Fraud Violations, Forfeits $100 Million in 
Deferred Prosecution (Nov. 9, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/moneygram-international-
inc-admits-anti-money-laundering-and-wire-fraud-violations-forfeits [https://perma.cc/8JQ5-
NBFZ]. 
 121.  See ABREGO, supra note 51, at 143; THAI, supra note 20, at 152.  
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Along these lines, the most obvious example is the intensification 
of enforcement policies at the U.S.–Mexico border, which has curtailed 
circular migration flows.122 Less obvious but equally important has 
been the intensification of screening protocols at airports and other 
ports of entry. Database screening protocols and No Fly Lists criteria 
disproportionately impact passengers who are associated with or are 
traveling to or from countries with significant Muslim communities.123 
Because of the expansive architecture of database screening and broad 
deference in regulating travel across borders, remitters who are 
traveling—even those with secure legal statuses such as citizenship or 
lawful permanent residence—must contend with uncertainty.124 
A second way that anti-money laundering policies make it harder 
to access financial services is by adding to the difficulties that poor 
migrants already experience on account of their poverty. Outside of 
the OFAC context, the Treasury Department does not dictate access 
to remittance channels on a day-to-day basis. Instead, banks largely 
make those decisions, and the disruptions to remittance channels 
illustrate one of the dangers of relying on banks to support social 
relationships.125 In her work on banking, Professor Mehrsa Baradaran 
observes that “[m]ost banks, especially the financial giants, no longer 
see their role as serving a community at large but view each customer 
as a potential source of profit.”126 Unless banks prioritize the 
transnational remittance economy (a constant but low-volume stream 
of economic activity), increases in regulatory scrutiny can raise costs to 
the point that derisking becomes a viable business strategy.  
Of course, different types of banks can exhibit different risk 
appetites. Smaller community banks, for example, do not have the 
same resources to absorb large swings in compliance costs that can 
 
 122.  See Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand & Karen A. Pren, Why Border Enforcement 
Backfired, 121 AM. J. SOCIO. 1557, 1557–58 (2016). 
 123.  See Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 668 (2017). 
 124.  See Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271, 277–
84 (2008). 
 125.  One GAO report finds:  
Treasury officials . . . noted that in implementing BSA/AML regulations, banks retain 
the flexibility to make business decisions such as which clients to accept, since banks 
are in the best position to know whether they are able to implement controls to manage 
the risk associated with any given client.  
GAO REPORT: REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 27. 
 126.  See BARADARAN, supra note 9, at 141.  
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arise when a customer has ties to laundering schemes.127 At the same 
time, large banks with established and recognizable brands have to 
take into account other factors that can increase costs beyond 
investigations and fines. Larger banks often have to consider possible 
consumer backlash from providing banking services to clients with 
lawful but controversial activities, such as religious organizations128 or 
legalized cannabis.129 Within this banking landscape, poor migrants 
often turn to money transfer organizations like Western Union, which 
are subject to some, but on balance, less regulatory oversight.130 These 
services generally require paying higher (and in some cases exorbitant) 
transaction fees.131  
Finally, derisking can also compound existing racial disparities 
within commercial settings.132 Communities nestled near the U.S.–
Mexico border have been especially impacted by derisking. Several 
banks along the U.S.–Mexico border closed those branches for this 
reason, rendering those communities banking deserts.133 This impacted 
 
 127.  See Ian McKendry, Banks Face No-Win Scenario on AML ‘De-Risking’, AM. BANKER 
(Nov. 17, 2014, 4:11 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/banks-face-no-win-scenario-
on-aml-de-risking [https://perma.cc/4D92-RYX9] (quoting an officer at a small bank who 
emphasized the importance of a careful cost-benefit analysis in this regulatory environment). 
 128.  See Sheila Tendy, De-Risking Threatens Religious Access to Banking Services, AM. 
BANKER (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/de-risking-
threatens-religious-access-to-banking-services [https://perma.cc/YTX6-PTER]. 
 129.  See McKendry, supra note 127. 
 130.  See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, New Rules for Money Transfers, but Few Limits, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/business/new-rules-for-money-
transfers-but-few-limits.html [https://perma.cc/H3CY-2Y6W] (illustrating the costs immigrants 
face using money transfer companies to send remittances to families living outside of the United 
States). 
 131.  See Stephen Wilks, A Complicated Alchemy: Theorizing Identity Politics and the 
Politicization of Migrant Remittances Under Donald Trump’s Presidency, 50 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
285, 288 n.11 (2017) (reporting that Western Union’s transactions fees exceeded $3.9 billion in 
2015); see also id. at 302–04 (describing the payment system taxonomy and how the further away 
from traditional banking, the more companies can charge vulnerable individuals large fees for 
banking services).  
 132.  A GAO report found that banks that closed accounts for derisking reasons did not do 
so in response to federal investigations. Rather, most banks closed accounts preemptively for fear 
of investigation. 80 percent of respondents indicated that they closed accounts to avoid the 
potential legal consequences and monetary fines that come with facilitating money laundering. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-263, BANK SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG 
THE SOUTHWEST BORDER HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR REGULATORS TO ENHANCE 
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS 18–19 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-263.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4QSG-NNA8] [hereinafter GAO, BANK SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG 
THE SOUTHWEST BORDER].  
 133.  See GAO, BANK SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, supra 
note 132, at 1; Garrick, supra note 119; Emily Glazer, Big Banks Shut Border Branches in Effort 
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community banks and credit unions, which are crucial to local 
economies.134 And because these communities have long been home to 
Latino migrants—and the site of extensive and pervasive law 
enforcement policies—the withdrawal of banking services piles onto a 
broad set of exclusionary institutional practices. Indeed, banks in 
communities with significant Latino populations might ratchet up the 
screening process at the front end in order to avoid getting fined by 
Treasury regulators. This creates biased disbursement of financial and 
lending services and puts banks in an impossible situation. On the one 
hand, banks must balance tightening up their banking services to avoid 
being fined for facilitating money laundering; on the other hand, banks 
must implement these screening measures in a way that is principled 
and unbiased to avoid liability under federal civil rights laws.135 
Given that financial controls in the money laundering context are 
so closely tied to anticriminal and antiterrorist objectives, remitters 
with ties to nations embroiled in these enforcement projects inevitably 
have their rights hampered in predictable, if unfair, ways. American 
Muslims and others with family ties to nations with significant Muslim 
populations face the reality that their financial assets may be seized 
with little legal recourse.136 Remitters to Central American countries 
with gang-related criminal threats, such as El Salvador137 or 
Guatemala,138 face similar kinds of uncertainty. 
D. A Joint Regulatory System 
Anti-money laundering and antimigration laws interact in various 
ways that affect noncitizens differently. For example, citizenship or 
lawful permanent residence confers on immigrants the ability to travel 
across borders. As described above, those migrants who enjoy this kind 
of freedom of movement will be the least affected by policy changes 
that lead to the restriction of remittance corridors. So to the extent that 
 
To Avoid Dirty Money, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2015, 8:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-
banks-shut-border-branches-in-effort-to-avoid-dirty-money-1432598865 [https://perma.cc/5M5L-
GUCJ]. 
 134.  See Curt Prendergast, GAO: Banks Left Border To Avoid Fines, Now Face Renewed 
Scrutiny, TUCSON (Mar. 24, 2018), https://tucson.com/news/local/gao-banks-left-border-to-avoid-
fines-now-face-renewed-scrutiny/article_57aef8ac-314b-5a06-af8d-7a039e9f62ef.html [https://perma.cc/ 
L264-5SJT]. 
 135.  See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606. 
 136.  See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 14006. 
 137.  ABREGO, supra note 51, at  133–34. 
 138.  See HEIDBRINK, supra note 39, at 133–34 .  
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political leaders and agencies can streamline or reduce hurdles for 
migrants seeking to obtain a green card or to naturalize, migrants will 
become desensitized to fluctuations in anti-money laundering policies. 
In other instances, it can be much harder for the president and 
agency officials to reconcile anti-money laundering policies and 
antimigration policies. Consider, for example, the challenges that 
President Reagan faced in the 1980s when trying to implement the 
wave of new immigration laws passed as part of IRCA. At the time, a 
significant percentage of unauthorized migrants had arrived from El 
Salvador and faced uncertainty over their ability to remain in the 
United States.139 Salvadoran President José Napoleón Duarte sent a 
confidential letter to President Reagan imploring him not to remove 
unauthorized Salvadoran migrants in the United States.140 According 
to Duarte, the remittances generated by the hundreds of thousands of 
migrants were critical to the country’s effort to rebuild its economy 
after years of unrest and natural disaster.141 This exchange illustrates 
how foreign dependence on access to U.S. labor markets provides the 
president and the executive an important negotiating tool. The broader 
context for this exchange also illustrates the degree to which 
nonenforcement decisions stemmed from purely political 
considerations rather than enduring legal principles. After rejecting 
President Duarte’s entreaty,142 for example, the Reagan administration 
implemented a policy of nonenforcement against Nicaraguans allowing 
two hundred thousand migrants to stay in the United States rather than 
be forced to return to a country and face dangerous conditions. While 
Nicaraguans and Salvadorans faced similar dangers at home, the 
Nicaraguan nonenforcement policy better aligned with U.S. anti-
communist foreign policy goals at the time. 
Congress eventually created the legal category of TPS (passed as 
a part of the Immigration Act of 1990) to help provide relief to 
Salvadoran migrants in the United States and more generally provided 
a more principled basis upon which relief might be provide where 
 
 139.  PEDERSEN, supra note 137, at 138. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See id.; see also Robert Pear, Duarte Appeals to Reagan To Let Salvadorans Stay, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 26, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/26/world/durate-appeals-to-reagan-to-
let-salvadorans-stay.html [https://perma.cc/J2WR-NJM8]. 
 142.  Robert Pear, Reagan Rejects Salvadoran Plea On Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
1987, at A1. 
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migrants faced dangerous conditions abroad.143 While the story of 
Salvadoran relief often is discussed within the context of the Sanctuary 
movement,144 it is unquestionably a key inflection point in social 
movements and activism in the immigration context. The backdrop of 
Reagan-era policies concerning immigration, money laundering, and 
foreign policy demonstrates how remittance flows figured into the 
calculus for regulating the lives and livelihood of migrants in the 
United States.145  
Closely analyzing how antimigration and anti-money laundering 
policies interact to jointly regulate migrant lives illustrates that the law 
governing remittances is much broader than what has been canvassed. 
In other words, these policies work together to regulate the lives and 
the livelihood of migrants. Much of the existing legal scholarship 
addressing remittances focuses on tax laws that shape the incentives of 
the different parties propping up the transnational remittance 
economy.146 Legal scholars often focus on the tax implications of the 
 
 143.  See Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-and-
asylum-policy-reagan-era [https://perma.cc/X2ZP-5G67].  
 144.  See SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST: RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM AND 
THE U.S. SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 223–28 (1993).  
 145.  Elected officials and regulators can reconcile these policies in ways other than by dialing 
down enforcement efforts. For example, President Trump threatened to ratchet up enforcement 
efforts against money transfer companies, using the threat of disruption to remittance flows for 
political gain. For example, early in his presidency, President Trump threatened to extend the 
“know your customer” rule to money transfer companies like Western Union unless Mexican 
officials did not agree to fund the construction of a wall on the U.S.–Mexico border. See Vanda 
Felbab-Brown, The Wall: The Real Costs of a Barrier Between the United States and Mexico, 
BROOKINGS (Aug. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/article/the-wall-the-real-costs-of-a-barrier-
between-the-united-states-and-mexico [https://perma.cc/DB56-MWBM]. In the days leading up 
to the 2020 election, the Trump administration issued a new regulation that prohibited Cuban 
entities with military ties from processing remittances, Press Release, U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, Treasury Prohibits Cuban Military from Processing Remittance-Related Transactions 
(Oct. 28, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1164 [https://perma.cc/NU3X-
ZQQA]; see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.421(a)(7) (excluding from the definition of “transaction[s] 
ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction” a “transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, 
or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted 
List”), thereby causing Western Union to shut down several businesses in Cuba, Kirk Semple, 
Cuba Says Restrictions Will Force Western Union Offices To Close, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/world/americas/cuba-western-union-remittances.html 
[https://perma.cc/U9XD-QZ9G]. 
 146.  See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 103–19 (analyzing benefits and costs of taxing 
remittances in receiving countries); Alberto Simpser, Lauren Duquette-Rury, José Antonio 
Hernández Company & Juan Fernando Ibarra, The Political Economy of Social Spending by 
Local Government, 51 LATIN AM. RSCH. REV. 62, 71–77 (2016) (analyzing the impacts of 
Mexico’s remittance “matching” program as an incentive for cross-border financial flows).  
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remittance economy and have exhibited concerns with policies that 
treat remitters fairly.147 Aside from fairness concerns, tax laws also 
impede the goal of reducing global poverty, a widely recognized benefit 
of remittance flows.148 Just as important are domestic enforcement laws 
imbued with a moral agenda often associated with criminal and 
national security law. This is important not just because we have a 
clearer understanding of the full range of laws regulating remittances 
but also because we must grapple with a broader range of interests that 
make it hard to develop a coherent set of normative commitments. 
Anti-money laundering policies present conceptual and 
implementation challenges that are distinct from the tax laws that 
receive scholarly attention. First, at the conceptual level, discussions of 
fairness in the tax context often involve debates about changing 
policies within at least two countries—the country in which the 
remittances originated, and the country in which remittances are 
received. Arguing in favor of a single taxation system means having to 
justify why one country should receive the taxation benefit but not the 
other. By contrast, anti-money laundering policies are characterized by 
a high degree of unilateralism compared to other controls over capital 
flows. Instead of tax treaties binding the United States and partner 
countries,149 the Treasury Department can simply place countries on a 
sanctions list or constrict remittance flows through a mix of civil and 
criminal investigations.150 Unlike bilateral and multilateral legal 
agreements, which can be difficult to forge and costly to ignore or 
invalidate, federal officials and regulators can usually implement anti-
money laundering policies as a matter of prosecutorial discretion and 
without the input of transnational stakeholders.151  
 
 147.  In particular, these scholars have trained their attention on the problems of double 
taxation and the unfairness that comes from forcing a wage earner to have to pay into two 
governance systems in different countries. See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 145–48; Ruth Mason, 
Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1540, 1610 (2009); Rosser, supra 
note 7. 
 148.  Professor Ezra Rosser argues that transaction barriers should be lowered to enable 
remittances to realize anti-poverty goals. In his estimation, “[t]he greatest potential regulatory 
threat to remittances is remittance taxation.” Rosser, supra note 7, at 37.  
 149.  See Mason, supra note 147, at 1567 (describing the difficulties of amending tax treaties).  
 150.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b) (describing a range of civil penalties for using financial 
instruments for money laundering purposes); 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b) (describing a range of criminal 
penalties for related violations of law); cf. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 840–43 (proposing 
noncompliance penalties and affirmative incentives to comply with reporting requirements 
imposed by anti-money laundering laws).  
 151.  See Cuéllar, supra note 86, at 337, 353–54, 357, 362–63 (discussing prosecutorial and 
regulatory discretion under anti-money laundering laws).  
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The unilateral nature of anti-money laundering and antimigration 
enforcement policies allows the executive to toggle between these two 
sets of laws to achieve a system of migration control. In this regard, the 
laws that regulators can use between and across contexts extends 
observations that other legal scholars have made about the modern 
immigration enforcement system. Professor David Sklansky observes 
that agency officials routinely toggle back and forth between 
immigration and criminal laws to punish noncitizens, thus creating an 
enforcement regime grounded in principles of “ad hoc 
instrumentalism,” in which pragmatic and outcome-oriented 
considerations take precedence over respect of formal legal 
categories.152 In a related vein, Professor Jennifer Chacón highlights 
the way that these converging and all-encompassing regimes place 
noncitizens in a state of “liminal legality” in which no degree of lawful 
status truly guarantees noncitizens a reprieve against the destabilizing 
effects of law.153 This same dynamic characterizes the regulation of 
financial institutions and flows in the antiterrorist context.  
To be clear, agency officials do face some limitations in the 
exercise of their discretionary authority. Three limits in particular 
come to mind. First, while the discretion of executive officials—of the 
president, political appointees, and civil servants—is broad with 
regards to unauthorized migrants, they have less latitude with lawful 
permanent residents and even less with citizens.154 Second, decisions 
made by regulators and their proxies (like employers and the local law 
enforcement officials) that transpire within the interior are subject to 
greater statutory and constitutional constraints than those transpiring 
wholly outside of the country. Enforcing immigration laws against 
workers must be reconciled with basic workplace protections.155 Many 
labor and employment laws cover workers irrespective of immigration 
 
 152.  David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 157, 197, 201–02 (2012); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through 
Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 139–47 (2009) (noting the prevalence of using criminal 
law and actors to address unauthorized migration without providing the procedural protections 
of criminal proceedings).  
 153.  Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 709, 730–31 
(2015). 
 154.  Admittedly, government officials have more latitude over citizens when enforcing laws 
at the border as well as with banking.  
 155.  See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor 
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 348 (2001) (noting the 
inherent conflict between IRCA and workplace protection laws). 
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status,156 which means migrants may be able to bring claims for wage 
and hour, workplace safety, or antidiscrimination violations on the 
basis of work they were not entitled to undertake in the first place.157 
Decisions to stop and frisk or arrest migrants is also subject to 
constitutional protections. By contrast, foreign aid disbursement 
decisions are reviewed under the much more deferential arbitrary and 
capricious standard.158 Finally, the president and the relevant agencies 
enjoy limited control over which countries ultimately receive the 
remittances by virtue of the private nature of the transfer of funds and 
assets.159  
Still, the larger point is that structural realities and constitutional 
doctrine confer a comparative advantage in terms of possessing the 
unilateral flexibility to enforce immigration and national security laws, 
at least when considering the alternative of conventional foreign aid 
channels through bilateral arrangements. The ability to disrupt the 
flow of people and capital gives agencies, and the president more 
generally, flexibility in attempting to disrupt criminal and terrorist 
activities. This is a hallmark of modern immigration enforcement 
policies.160  
All of this created an immigration system that offers agencies a 
wide array of tools nested within malleable concepts of crime control 
and national security. Political and legal actors are incentivized to 
enforce anti-money laundering laws to signal to the public their 
commitment to eradicating harmful activities like trafficking and 
 
 156.  See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891–92 (1984) (holding that undocumented 
workers are protected by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. 
Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) (including undocumented workers within the meaning of “employee” 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 705 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that undocumented workers should be considered “employees” under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act).  
 157.  See Nessel, supra note 155, at 349 (arguing that “immigration law is enforced and 
interpreted in such a way as to render any NLRA remedies meaningless for aggrieved workers 
who lack proper immigration status”). 
 158.  See Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 493–94 
(2014) (describing foreign hard look review, which determines whether an agency action is 
arbitrary or capricious).  
 159.  See Dilip Ratha, Remittances: Funds for the Folks Back Home, INT’L MONETARY FUND 
(Feb. 24, 2020), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/remitt.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
N4X4-AV7B] (stating that “[i]t is hard to estimate the exact size of remittance flows because 
many transfers take place through unofficial channels”); see also Rosser, supra note 7, at 13 
(stating that remittances are primarily used to support the basic needs of family abroad).  
 160.  See Sklansky, supra note 152, at 201–04 (arguing that modern immigration enforcement 
and national security practices are characterized by flexibility, a phenomenon that Sklansky terms 
“ad hoc instrumentalism”).  
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terrorism. Whether or not enforcement decisions actually accomplish 
deterrence or other legitimate enforcement goals is less important than 
giving administrators the ability to point to concrete instances of 
punishing bad actors, even if they are not the most deserving of 
punishment.161  
E.  Deference to Enforcement Decisions 
As antiterrorism projects, both antimigration and anti-money 
laundering laws often receive significant deference from courts, which 
confers wide latitude upon federal officials in setting polices. Like 
other social and economic problems folded into the umbrella of 
national security challenges, policies in these arenas often get the 
benefit of broad discretionary powers and judicial deference. Scholars 
often criticize the many social and economic costs that come with such 
an arrangement. As is the case in the immigration enforcement 
context, national security justifications often make it difficult to 
challenge anti-money laundering policies.  
On the antimigration enforcement side, courts are highly 
deferential when officials defend regulatory actions on national 
security grounds, which leaves noncitizens with little judicial recourse 
and raises the risks of error or abuse.162 This dynamic applies to both 
standard immigration law problems as well as to remittance-related 
problems. The most notable thing here is that those accused of 
engaging in terrorist activity have limited procedural rights.163 Without 
meaningful notice or a hearing, this adjudicatory system creates the 
risk of mistaken convictions and removals and invites abuse by 
executive officials. This is one of the main contributions of the court 
system: the threat of generous discovery laws deters institutional actors 
like the federal government from engaging in potentially unlawful or 
embarrassing behavior. Here, courts have intervened in only measured 
 
 161.  See Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity, supra note 105, at 
44; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and 
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1865–75 (2007).  
 162.  See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 104 (2015). Dean Kerry Abrams has argued that 
while courts still defer to Executive decisions grounded in national security rationales, the 
growing recognition of familial relationships provide one potential basis for reining in this 
deference. See Kerry Abrams, Family Reunification and the Security State, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 
247, 248–50 (2017).  
 163.  See Chacón, supra note 161, at 1871–72 (describing the curtailed constitutional rights for 
migrants in the national security enforcement context).  
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ways.164 This system, which proceeds without the full array of 
information-producing measures typically offered by courts, creates 
the risk of erroneous or abusive decisions. A long string of immigration 
decisions from the Cold War era165 and the post-September 11 era166 
demonstrate the Supreme Court’s willingness to defer to immigration 
officials when national security justifications are offered. Moreover, 
the relatively uneventful and inconsequential postscripts that followed 
those decisions cast doubt on the veracity, or at least the depth, of the 
government’s asserted concerns with national security.  
All of this provides a more complete picture of how intentionally 
broad and vague conceptions of public security frame and justify 
policies that impact migrants in the United States. Laws that empower 
immigration officials to identify, detain, and expel migrants with little 
judicial oversight arise from the same legislative spring as the laws that 
enable financial regulators to flag, reroute, and disrupt financial flows. 
Drawing this connection between these two regulatory arenas also 
illustrates the range of legal tools available to elected and bureaucratic 
officials in managing relations with other countries. Indeed, a common 
set of themes binds the scholarly discourse in each of these areas. In 
terms of migration scholarship, legal scholars focus on how national 
security laws have reduced the civil liberties of migrants and those who 
appear to be migrants,167 observing that these reductions are allocated 
in discriminatory ways.168 Abuse by executive officials, enabled by 
broad doctrines of deference, has preoccupied this discussion with an 
eye toward the harms that have been exacted upon migrant bodies.169 
The concurrent rise of “criminal aliens” and “terrorists” to foster a 
“public security” state shows how the harms exacted upon migrant 
 
 164.  See Shirin Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 991, 1047–49 (2018).  
 165.  See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 580 (1952); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 537 (1950); Jennifer Gordon, 
Immigration as Commerce: A New Look at the Federal Immigration Power and the Constitution, 
93 IND. L.J. 653, 664–65, 706 (2018); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of 
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 
559 (1990).  
 166.  See Kerry, 576 U.S. at 106. For an argument that the Court exhibits less deference to the 
political branches when family unification claims are involved, see Abrams, supra note 162, at 
269–79. 
 167.  See Chacón, supra note 161, at 1850–56. 
 168.  See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International” 
Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1363–66 (2019). 
 169.  See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1562–71 (2009).  
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bodies is intertwined with the constraints placed on migrants’ 
livelihoods—the money they earn, share, and transfer. 
On the financial regulation side, legal scholars have also argued 
that the law in this area engenders abuse, both by regulators as well as 
by private intermediaries enlisted into the project of surveilling and 
reporting.170 But this abuse has been largely tied to critiques of the 
arbitrariness of decision-making and the confusion surrounding the 
legal obligations that these laws impose on private actors. Embedding 
financial controls like anti-money laundering laws within a broader 
system that aims to protect U.S. citizens by controlling the migration 
and mobility of noncitizens illustrates the broader stakes tied up in the 
freezing of assets. And while impeding the ability of individuals to send 
money overseas through financial institutions may not generate harms 
that are as severe or drastic as physical imprisonment, the harms 
associated with financial immobility stem from the same impulse to 
neutralize foreign threats even in the absence of firm information. In 
this regard, the desire to disrupt financial channels fits into a larger 
regulatory project that relies on the dehumanization of its targets—the 
treatment of migrants as criminals and terrorists and remitters as 
financiers and unwitting lemmings.  
Although broad doctrines of deference give the executive 
significant room to go it alone within the antimigration and anti-money 
laundering policy arenas, recent years produced some notable 
instances of bilateral cooperation. Both the Obama and Trump 
administrations engaged in “border externalization” strategies, which 
enlist the help of other countries to deter migration flows at the U.S.–
Mexico border.171 The Alliance for Prosperity Plan, for example, 
provides funds to countries in the “Northern Triangle” in Central 
America in exchange for, among other things, increased enforcement 
against money laundering and cash smuggling, along with other 
criminal activity associated with unlawful migration.172 And migration 
 
 170.  See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 70, at 1394–1418; Lee, Constitutional Cash, supra note 
105, at 598. 
 171.  See Ana Muñiz, Bordering Circuitry: Crossjurisdictional Immigration Surveillance, 66 
UCLA L. REV. 1636, 1650–55 (2019); Cecilia Menjívar, Immigration Law Beyond Borders: 
Externalizing and Internalizing Border Controls in an Era of Securitization, 10 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 353, 357–60 (2014).  
 172.  See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Support for the Alliance for Prosperity 
in the Northern Triangle (Mar. 3, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/03/03/fact-sheet-support-alliance-prosperity-northern-triangle [https://perma.cc/HQU5-
ASLV]; Jennifer Fowler, Treasury Participates in Latin American Financial Action Task Force 
Meetings Focused on Combatting Illicit Finance, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 17, 2015), 
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protection protocols, such as the “Remain in Mexico” policy, require 
U.S. immigration officials to work with their counterparts in the 
Mexican government to manage the population of asylum seekers.173 
Yet these plans confirm the broader point about unilateralism. 
This broad power combined with the economic influence of the United 
States gives the executive leverage in setting favorable terms in 
bilateral agreements. Both the Alliance for Prosperity Plan and the 
Remain in Mexico policy advance a mix of antimigration and anti-
money laundering policies in ways that reduce costs for regulators even 
if they might also increase human costs in other ways. In other contexts, 
developing nations have been able to gain leverage in setting the terms 
of bilateral agreements with developed nations, but those instances 
have been rare, and in any event, have not yet transpired within the 
context of the United States.174 
III.  THEORIZING THE LAW REGULATING REMITTANCES 
Thus far, I have tried to make two points: (1) remittances function 
as a kind of economic expression of affinity between family members; 
and (2) anti-money laundering laws work in conjunction with 
antimigration laws to foster a system of long-term and normalized 
family separation. These two points provide some descriptive clarity on 
 
https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Fowler-Latin-American-GAFILAT.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/KX86-MHFQ]; see also 2 BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENF’T AFFS., U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING 
24 (2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Tab-2-INCSR-Vol-2-508.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MLW4-GWKU] (noting that El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras all present 
vulnerabilities within a broader anti-money laundering strategy). The Alliance for Prosperity Plan 
also imposes conditions on participating countries to better develop their economies and legal 
and political institutions to address push factors of migration. See Dawn Paley, Obama’s Central 
American Rescue Plan Will Only Make Life There Worse, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 5, 2015), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/120962 [https://perma.cc/TT9Q-PVCK]. 
 173.  See ARIEL G. RUIZ SOTO, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., ONE YEAR AFTER THE U.S.-
MEXICO AGREEMENT: RESHAPING MEXICO’S MIGRATION POLICIES 4 (2020), https:// 
www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/OneYearAfterUS-MexAgreement-EN-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZRF-57U6]. 
 174.  For example, after reports of severe abuse and even deaths of Filipina domestic workers 
at the hands of Kuwaiti employers, the Philippines negotiated a bilateral labor migration 
agreement with Kuwait that included greater protections for Filipina workers. Ahmed Hagagy, 
Kuwait To Regulate Employment of Philippine Domestic Workers After Reports of Abuse, 
REUTERS (May 11, 2018, 9:08 AM), https://reut.rs/2jMSM2G [https://perma.cc/QZ2N-BYU2]. 
Central to this effort was the Philippines’ threat to cut off labor migration altogether. See id. For 
an excellent analysis of the potential for bilateral agreements to protect domestic workers, see 
Shayak Sarkar, The New Legal World of Domestic Work, 32 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 38–44 
(2020).  
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how the law regulates the transnational remittance economy. Yet, as 
economic transactions, remittances remain undertheorized by legal 
decision-makers and scholars. For this reason, it can be hard to figure 
out how the descriptive picture provided in this Article fits into a 
broader set of normative commitments—to figure out when law ought 
to expand remittance markets and when it ought to curtail them. 
My account prominently features state actors and public law. In 
this regard, my account complements the descriptive picture painted 
by the few legal scholars who address remittances as a migrant 
phenomenon. Starting with the observation that the law typically 
permits capital to flow freely across borders while clamping down on 
migrant flow, Professor Shayak Sarkar argues that there are several 
instances in which this distinction collapses upon itself.175 Specifically, 
he provides a helpful taxonomy of laws across federal and state 
regulatory contexts that constrain capital flows as attempts to disrupt 
migrant mobility.176 Given that these laws arise within various branches 
of government, Sarkar focuses on how these laws implicate different 
constitutional doctrines, such as preemption and federalism,177 while 
leaving aside the social meaning of remittances and the range of harms 
that flow from different capital controls.  
Other legal scholars have recognized the social meaning of 
remittances, but most of their analysis focuses on the legal controls 
imposed by governments in remittance-receiving countries. Professor 
Ezra Rosser, for example, endorses a robust remittance economy and 
encourages governments in remittance-receiving countries to give 
significant weight to the views of communities most directly impacted 
by remittances.178 Professor Ariel Stevenson similarly argues that tax 
reforms that focus on the ability of governments in migrant-sending 
(that is, remittance-receiving) countries to tax remittance income 
better account for migrant well-being when compared to alternative 
tax structures.179 Both of these accounts prioritize migrant well-being 
and subjectivity, but neither considers how the state’s power to 
regulate remittances fits within its power to regulate migration.180 
 
 175.  Sarkar, supra note 7, at 805.  
 176.  See id. at 808–35. 
 177.  Id. at 836–58. 
 178.  See Rosser, supra note 7, at 58. 
 179.  See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 102. 
 180.  Professor Rosser explicitly brackets the question of how U.S. immigration policy figures 
into debates about how legal controls ought to be calibrated over remittance flows even when he 
offers a clear-eyed (and in my opinion, correct) critique that “remittance practices must be 
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Sarkar, Rosser, and Stevenson have all created an important 
foundation for engaging with the topic of how the law ought to 
constrain remittance markets. And in many respects, my account 
overlaps with theirs. Sarkar is right to suggest that sometimes capital 
controls represent an extension of attempts to penalize noncitizens on 
the basis of immigration status. This resonates with my focus on the 
shared legislative origins of the MLCA (which empowers banks to 
identify suspicious transactions) and IRCA (which empowers 
employers to identify unauthorized workers). Similarly, Rosser and 
Stevenson prioritize migrant well-being and argue in favor of 
protecting cross-border familial love from intrusive state power, which 
is effectively what I argue in characterizing remittances as a part of a 
broader normalized state of family separation.  
Yet missing from this picture is domestic law, especially of the law 
enforcement variety. Domestic enforcement power is broad especially 
when it advances immigration goals. Therefore, any attempts to 
theorize remittances must account for domestic power and whether 
any values might constrain the exercise of such power. In this Part, I 
sketch out two types of theoretical commitments, one articulated in 
terms of law and a second expressed in terms of political realities.  
A. Legal Commitments 
To the extent that the Supreme Court has theorized the legal 
controls of transnational remittances, it has focused on remitters’ 
expectations of privacy for information submitted to banks and 
financial institutions to use banking services. In United States v. 
Miller,181 the Supreme Court held that bankers have no legitimate 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.182 Financial 
statements and deposit slips—documents that can shine a light on 
money laundering activities—reflect information that customers have 
freely given away as a part of engaging in ordinary business 
 
protected against regulatory practices or taxes that raise the cost of sending money to loved ones.” 
Rosser, supra note 7, at 59. Similarly, Professor Stevenson recognizes that remittances arise out 
of a workforce that lacks lawful status, but does not address the immigration policies creating that 
reality. See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 102 n.4. 
 181.  The Supreme Court initially held that the recordkeeping requirements of the Bank 
Secrecy Act (“BSA”) were constitutional in California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 
21, 52 (1974). United States v. Miller addressed the more specific question of whether the issuance 
of a subpoena to obtain  bank records created under the BSA violated the Fourth Amendment. 
425 U.S. 435, 441 (1976). 
 182.  Miller, 425 U.S. at 442, 446. 
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transactions.183 Miller was important because it addressed the 
constitutionality of the BSA’s recordkeeping requirements.184 By 
putting bank records outside the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court effectively constitutionalized the legal infrastructure supporting 
the modern anti-money laundering system. 
A few years later, in Smith v. Maryland,185 the Supreme Court 
addressed a similar Fourth Amendment challenge regarding phone 
logs. Smith holds that callers have no expectation of privacy in phone 
logs held by telephone companies.186 During this same period, the 
Court also confronted gatekeeping questions in the context of 
employer screening of workers. In De Canas v. Bica187 (decided the 
same term as Miller), the Court holds that a California law prohibiting 
employers from hiring noncitizens without lawful status was not 
preempted under federal law at the time.188 All of these cases—Miller, 
Smith, and De Canas—create a law enforcement landscape in which 
Congress could enlist the help of banks and other third parties as 
gatekeepers with little constitutional consequence. These cases help to 
normalize economic practices in which individual actors—bank 
customers and workers—share information with more powerful 
economic actors—banks and employers—to relinquish control over 
identifying information as a part of ordinary course of business.189  
The gatekeeping dimension is a part of what makes anti-money 
laundering laws unique as a regulatory tool. Like other laws grounded 
in criminal and national security projects, enforcement officials are left 
to decide by themselves how to strike the proper balance between 
national security and criminal law enforcement goals and human costs. 
But anti-money laundering laws operate in an enforcement landscape 
in which a record has been gathered and curated by banks and other 
financial entities, which makes it particularly easy for regulators to pick 
and choose which targets to choose.  
In this regard, the legal commitments governing anti-money 
laundering law decisions are similar to those governing immigration 
 
 183.  See id. at 442. 
 184.  See id. at 441–43. 
 185.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 186.  See id. at 737–38, 745. 
 187.  De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
 188.  Id. at 352–53, 365 (“It suffices that this Court decide at this time that the Court of Appeal 
erred in holding that Congress in the INA precluded any state authority to regulate the 
employment of illegal aliens.”). 
 189. See e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. 
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enforcement decisions, which unfold in a context that treats state 
power as “plenary.”190 Beginning in 1990, Congress made criminal law 
rationales and tools a central part of its strategy to regulate 
immigration flows.191 Congress began developing the legal 
infrastructure to enlist the help of local police in the immigration 
enforcement project.192 Concerns with terrorism added to the impulse 
of expanding the reach of agencies and federal officials. After both the 
World Trade Center bombing of 1993 and then the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, Congress further empowered executive officials 
to take broad and far-reaching measures to ensure the safety and 
security of Americans. In particular, the September 11 attacks 
prompted Congress to expand enforcement tools in ways that better 
allowed for immigration laws to identify and apprehend potential 
terrorists. In 2001, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act;193 in 2002, the 
Homeland Security Act;194 and in 2004, the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act.195 All of these laws drastically expand the 
reach of agencies in fighting foreign terrorist threats through mix-and-
match enforcement settings and procedural protections.196 As a result, 
 
 190.  See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 604 (2013). 
 191.  See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. Professor 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández argues that the lawmaking of this period was defined by 
immigration law absorbing and succumbing to criminal law penalties and logics. See García 
Hernández, supra note 201, at 1361. This war on drugs justified creating a system of coordinated 
enforcement across two systems—criminal law and immigration law—that had historically 
remained separate. See id. at 1360–72. 
 192.  While the local enforcement of immigration laws has forced many difficult constitutional 
questions in the last decade, Congress created the statutory framework for this phenomenon in 
1996. See Amada Armenta, From Sheriff’s Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant 
Status in a Tennessee Jail, 34 LAW & POL’Y 191, 192–93 (2012).  In contrast to earlier eras in which 
courts and the public viewed federal control over policing with skepticism, this new era tried to 
naturalize federal participation in this traditionally local endeavor. Professor Trevor Gardner 
explains, “Contemporary immigration enforcement is premised on a single, overarching 
administrative system designed by the federal government to enforce federal immigration law. . . . 
[A]nd it presumes the universal participation of state and local police departments.” See Gardner, 
supra note 198, at 62.  
 193.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. 
 194.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
 195.  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 
(2004). 
 196.  See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and 
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1100–20 (2008). And then in 2005, Congress 
passed the REAL ID Act, which sets standards for states to issue driver’s licenses, again as a way 
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Congress layered a national security agenda on top of an immigration 
system that was already bending toward transnational crime control.197 
The example of anti-money laundering laws actually bolsters the 
case made by immigration scholars who characterize the modern 
immigration enforcement system as one committed to ensuring and 
maintaining “public security” through U.S. immigration laws.198 But 
the example of anti-money laundering laws suggest that the breadth 
and vagueness are built into the regulatory project itself. Broad 
doctrines of deference combined with recordkeeping requirements 
implemented by private gatekeepers blur the boundaries of power and 
complicate the process of maintaining accountability in this system. 
The development of anti-money laundering policies and antimigration 
policies track one another, which sets a thicker foundation for 
articulating critiques of public security enforcement goals. Public 
security scholarship focuses on the historical role of the police, 
antiterrorism campaigns, and xenophobia, which all converge in the 
contemporary immigration system to identify and control a dangerous 
“other” whose specter justifies the promulgation of far-reaching laws 
and regulations.199 Professor Jennifer Chacón observes, “Irregular 
migration, crime committed by non-citizens (or those perceived as non-
citizens) and terrorist threats are all subsumed under the broad rubric 
of national security threats.”200 Public security is an intentionally broad 
and vague term meant to capture the unwieldy and often contradictory 
enforcement policies that animate our immigration system.201 
For the most part, legal scholars have used the concept of public 
security to describe immigration or antimigration laws. Both 
antimigration and anti-money laundering policies share a foundation 
built on criminal law logic that was later expanded to address national 
 
to prevent noncitizen terrorists from moving through society and the economy without some 
degree of surveillance. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 70, at 1374–76. The REAL ID Act also 
imposed stricter screening requirements on asylum seekers and vested greater discretion in the 
hands of asylum judges. See id. at 1374–94. 
 197.  See Sinnar, supra note 168, at 1397; Amy L. Stein, A Statutory National Security 
President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183, 1193–97 (2018).  
 198.  See Trevor George Gardner, Immigrant Sanctuary as the “Old Normal”: A Brief History 
of Police Federalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2019); Chacón, supra note 161, at 1831.  
 199.  See Gardner, supra note 198, at 1; Chacón, supra note 161, at 1831. 
 200.  See Chacón, supra note 161, at 1831.  
 201.  See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1360, 1379–80 (2014); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1281, 1298, 1330 (2010). 
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security concerns.202 Together, they form a set of interlocking public 
security policies in which expansive enforcement programs are justified 
to pursue vaguely defined foreign criminals and terrorists. Both sets of 
policies empower regulators with a wide degree of latitude to surveil, 
partner with, and sometimes coerce private entities to identify 
potentially dangerous targets.  
B. Political Commitments 
A part of the allure of remittance markets is the political appeal 
of having markets solve global poverty, which deemphasizes the state’s 
role in structuring markets.203 And a part of what makes anti-money 
laundering laws so noteworthy as a governance strategy has been the 
willingness of banks and other private financial institutions to 
cooperate with regulators.204 The implication, of course, is that state 
actors are dependent upon, and therefore must cede some degree of 
power to, market actors. Given how much money flows out of the 
United States to the Global South in the form of remittances, one could 
argue that state actors should cede this power. 
Viewed from the perspective of U.S. state actors, remittances 
function as a kind of de facto version of foreign aid, a privatized 
counterpart to state-to-state transfers that typically define foreign aid 
packages. American foreign policy contains an antipoverty 
component, which includes foreign aid packages to governments of 
nations struggling to develop economic infrastructure or experiencing 
instability wrought by unforeseen natural disasters.205 Rather than the 
federal government drawing from its coffers to provide aid directly to 
Mexico, the Philippines, and other countries in which demand for 
migration opportunities to the United States remains high, the 
domestic labor market creates opportunities for workers to realize 
some of the same benefits indirectly.206 Like other forms of foreign aid, 
 
 202.  See id. at 1869–73.  
 203.  As Professor Ezra Rosser observes, part of the allure of fostering remittance markets is 
the discursive emphasis on the “minimal role of the state and the power of people acting 
independently to improve their own situation.” See Rosser, supra note 7, at 52. And to be clear, 
Professor Rosser is critical of discourse uncritically embracing market-based solutions. See id. at 
51–52.  
 204.  See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 888–93.  
 205.  See George Ingram, What Every American Should Know About US Foreign Aid, 
BROOKINGS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/what-every-
american-should-know-about-us-foreign-aid [https://perma.cc/2B3G-78PT]. 
 206.  While remittances are subject to a different set of legal rules than foreign aid, they are 
often understood in the public eye as interchangeable, or at least as complementary goods. See 
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remittances advance U.S. policy goals like development and 
humanitarian relief in receiving countries,207 but do so by harnessing 
the labor of migrants within the United States to generate economic 
and social goods in receiving countries.208  
As a form of foreign aid, remittance markets offer an important 
advantage to state-directed disbursements: remittances can mitigate 
some of the problems of graft, which is a persistent obstacle to realizing 
the benefits of foreign aid.209 With no meaningful way of monitoring 
on-the-ground disbursement practices in developing nations, parties to 
bilateral and multilateral agreements often contend with the reality 
that corrupt local officials will siphon off payments as the aid makes its 
way (if at all) to the intended beneficiaries.210 In this regard, harnessing 
remittances for aid purposes largely avoids the graft problem because 
wage earning transfers operate through private channels instead of by 
entrusting governmental agencies in foreign countries with distribution 
choices. 
As a market-based solution for addressing global poverty, 
propping up remittance markets does face some limitations. Given the 
transnational familial context of remittances, such money transfers 
most directly benefit relatives of remitters and sometimes community 
members from their hometown or region. This therefore excludes 
those who live in remittance-receiving countries lacking similar 
 
Rohit Sudarshan, Remittances: A Complement to International Aid, PROSPER (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://csisprosper.com/2017/04/11/remittances-a-complement-to-international-aid [https:// 
perma.cc/X5YW-PMBX]. 
 207.  But see Rosser, supra note 7, at 5 (“Remittances . . . can alleviate some of the hardships 
families face because of a lack of local opportunities in their home countries. Ultimately, while 
remittances are ‘hot’ in development circles, remittances are by their very nature better suited to 
reducing poverty than fueling lasting development.”). 
 208.  See id. at 20 (“Remittances impact not only recipient families but also, in the aggregate, 
have important and potentially negative consequences for the economies of remittance-receiving 
countries.”).  
 209.  See Ann M. Simmons, U.S. Foreign Aid: A Waste of Money or a Boost to World Stability? 
Here Are the Facts, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2017, 8:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-
global-aid-true-false-20170501-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/FR7C-7D89]. There is some 
evidence of self-dealing in spending policies in remittance-receiving countries. In particular, 
Mexico has a “remittance-matching” program in which local governments will match funds 
remitted into Mexico from overseas. Simpser et al., supra note 146, at 63. Such programs have 
benefitted local governments in ways that do not always directly benefit individuals, although the 
broader observation remains that remittances that go directly into the hands of family members 
reduces the likelihood of graft as compared to state-to-state transfers. See id. 
 210.  Laura Iesue, The Alliance for Prosperity Plan: A Failed Effort for Stemming Migration, 
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFS. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.coha.org/the-alliance-for-
prosperity-plan-a-failed-effort-for-stemming-migration [https://perma.cc/3Q72-D47Y].  
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relationships with individuals in the United States.211 Moreover, the 
range of uses for remittances is limited. Remittances typically can buy 
food and clothing, start a business, pay for education, or buy or 
renovate a house—which are all steps toward climbing out of poverty. 
By contrast, foreign aid can serve a variety of purposes. Some forms of 
aid seek to foster development or alleviate the exigencies of natural 
disaster, which roughly correlate to the remittance narrative in that the 
aid aims to serve the poorest and most vulnerable within the recipient 
country.212 But other foreign policy goals tied up in other forms of aid 
bear no resemblance to this story.213 Afghanistan and Israel routinely 
receive significant disbursements of U.S. foreign aid.214 The aid has 
been provided to advance national security and counterterrorism 
goals,215 neither of which can plausibly be realized through 
remittances.216 Finally, allowing money transfers to flow through 
 
 211.  In Lauren Heidbrink’s ethnographic work on remittance channels between the United 
States and Guatemala, some of her interview subjects in Guatemala expressed the view that 
“[o]nly families benefit, not communities,” when it comes to remittance flows. See HEIDBRINK, 
supra note 39, at 148–49. At the same time, other studies have shown that remittances can reach 
even rural regions that lie beyond formal networks within the remittance-receiving country. In 
their ethnographic study of the remittance economy in El Salvador, Professors Hernandez and 
Coutin found that remittances from the United States “would reach everywhere, even rural areas, 
and would go directly into the pockets of recipients.” Hernandez & Coutin, supra note 43, at 198.  
 212.  See William Easterly, Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?, 17 J. ECON. PERSPS. 23, 34–38 
(2003). 
 213.  Such as when the United States sends military equipment or other assets of value to the 
recipient country.  
 214.  Simmons, supra note 209. 
 215.  See U.S. Relations with Afghanistan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm [https://perma.cc/MUN8-AYV2] (noting that 
“Afghanistan remains an important partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism”); 
Laurel E. Miller, The Challenges and the Benefits for U.S. National Security of Providing Foreign 
Assistance to Afghanistan, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs 1–2 (May 9, 2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ 
testimonies/CT400/CT493/RAND_CT493.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H3U-DMSH] (noting that the 
purpose of the War in Afghanistan “was not, of course, to make Afghanistan a nicer place for 
Afghans but, rather, was to pursue U.S. national security interests in destroying al-Qaeda and—
because it had provided a safe haven to al-Qaeda—the Taliban”); Emma Green, Why Does the 
United States Give So Much Money to Israel?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/united-states-israel-memorandum-of-
understanding-military-aid/500192 [https://perma.cc/D2Q6-FJH7] (describing the U.S.-Israel 
relationship as a “diplomatic and military alliance between the two countries [that] is 
longstanding”).  
 216.  If anything, government officials would argue that remittances undermine these goals 
by funding transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
MEXICO: DETAILED ASSESSMENT REPORT—ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING 
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 9 (2017), https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2017/ 
405/002.2017.issue-405-en.xml [https://perma.cc/H7XD-NJH2]; David Cohen, Under Sec’y for 
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private channels will make it harder to know how much has been 
transferred.217 
At the same time, when compared to more conventional state-to-
state transfers of aid, remittances provide the executive branch with a 
relative degree of autonomy in terms of interrupting the flow of cash 
transfers. U.S. agencies commonly work with their state-level 
counterparts in the receiving country—facilitating transnational 
remittances as a form of foreign aid is purely a function of domestic 
enforcement policy, especially as those policies impact immigration 
and anti-money laundering objectives.218 By contrast, the president and 
agencies, most notably the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
enjoy nearly unfettered discretion and autonomy in this enforcement 
realm. As Professor Jennifer Gordon observes, policies governing 
immigration can proceed on unilateral terms given that a country 
decides for itself how it admits and welcomes newcomers.219 Although 
Professor Gordon was making this argument in the context of 
immigration policies, the same logic can be extended to domestic anti-
money laundering controls over remittance flows. Compared to 
bilateral tax treaties, which require negotiation with and the 
cooperation of another country, anti-money laundering policies permit 
officials to control flows from within the Treasury Department using 
only domestic actors.  
Importantly, the nature of state power in the context of regulating 
remittances is often rendered invisible by the market logic that 
dominates remittance debates. Policy advocates associated with both 
the political left and right often invoke a kind of cost-benefit analysis 
 
Terrorism & Fin. Intel., Remarks Before the Center for a New American Security on 
“Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing” (Mar. 4, 2014), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx [https://perma.cc/R7GB-
STHT].  
 217.  This is something that has long concerned public law scholars in the context of 
privatization schemes. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 
722–23 (2010). 
 218.  Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107 CALIF. 
L. REV. 583, 665–66 (2019).  
 219.  See Jennifer Gordon, People Are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade, 
104 NW. U. L. REV. 1109, 1138 (2010) (“In the case of labor migration, . . . developed country 
governments can legislate whatever sort of immigration program they desire without engaging 
any developing countries at all.”); see also Hiroshi Motomura, The New Migration Law: Migrants, 
Refugees, and Citizens in an Anxious Age, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 505 (2020) (“To satisfy 
demand with workers with little formal education, destination country governments allow labor 
migration, both lawful and outside the law—almost always acting unilaterally to get them without 
explicitly cooperating with other countries.”). 
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to support migration, which could easily be extended to support 
broader remittance channels.220 The argument is that American 
consumers benefit from migration through lower costs of goods and 
services, and migrants benefit from access to labor markets offering 
higher wages than what is available in their home countries. 
Remittance markets reflect the predictable consequence of capital 
flows from this kind of work, prompting arguments about the costs of 
such an arrangement. Hence, the debate focuses on arguments that 
immigrants take the jobs that Americans won’t (thereby mitigating 
arguments about labor market costs),221 or that immigrants commit 
fewer crimes than U.S.-born natives (thereby addressing concerns with 
social costs).222  
These are effective, pragmatic arguments that can help preserve 
the limited protections and opportunities currently enjoyed by 
vulnerable unauthorized migrants. But over the long-term, the market 
logic of cost-benefit analysis—which runs throughout remittances 
debates—runs the risk of distracting the public from the state’s role in 
structuring these markets, whether by limiting opportunities to move 
across borders freely or by turning a blind eye to private exploitation. 
As Professors Ester Hernandez and Susan Bibler Coutin explain, “[b]y 
defining remittances as altruistic gifts or unrequited transfers, central 
banks ignore certain costs (such as alien-smuggling fees or fees charged 
by money transfer agencies) born [sic] by migrants and make 
remittances appear to be cost-free.”223 It valorizes what the market, and 
specifically what the domestic labor market, can achieve at a global 
level.  
 
 220.  See Pia Orrenius, Benefits of Immigration Outweigh the Costs, GEORGE W. BUSH INST.: 
THE CATALYST (Spring 2016), https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/north-american-
century/benefits-of-immigration-outweigh-costs.html [https://perma.cc/Y6VZ-329J]; Tom 
Jawetz, Building a More Dynamic Economy: The Benefits of Immigration, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (June 26, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/building-dynamic-
economy-benefits-immigration [https://perma.cc/MK7U-WMNA].  
 221.  See Julia Preston, Immigrants Aren’t Taking Americans’ Jobs, New Study Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/immigrants-arent-taking-
americans-jobs-new-study-finds.html [https://perma.cc/48P4-T27E] (presenting the progressive 
argument that “immigrants contribute to the economy whether they are here legally or not, by 
providing labor for American employers and opening businesses that create jobs for Americans 
rather than taking them”).  
 222.  See Kari Hong, The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067, 
2072 (2017) (“[N]on-citizens commit fewer crimes and reoffend less often than citizens.”); see also 
Sklansky, supra note 152, at 193 (“[T]he rise of crimmigration cannot be attributed to a growing 
problem of crime committed by noncitizens . . . .”).  
 223.  See Hernandez & Coutin, supra note 43, at 201. 
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The “markets will save us” mindset that focuses on the costs and 
benefits of allowing migrants to remit some of their wages to support 
family members avoids the obvious point that certain jobs are so 
exploitative that they simply should not exist.224 That is an issue that 
should be answered by state, not market, actors. For this reason, 
debates about mass legalization programs implicate remittance 
markets. Banks that cancel individual accounts or that shut down entire 
branches exacerbate inequalities because electronic money transfers 
remain one of the only opportunities for migrants to stay connected 
with family members. But loosening restrictions on travel across 
borders can take the pressure off of banks. If given the ability to move 
back and forth across borders, migrants can hand over and share 
remittances in person, thereby freeing banks to focus on activities that 
truly signal or support dangerous behaviors such as drug trafficking or 
terrorism. In the United States, the only legal status that provides near 
unfettered mobility is citizenship, and to a certain extent, lawful 
permanent residence.  
A mass legalization program would begin to correct the cramped 
vision of family reunification that immigration policy currently 
embraces.225 Recent mass legalization bills include the opportunity to 
gain these statuses usually after a conditional period, which would not 
only provide some measure of security for migrants living in the United 
States, but would also provide greater certainty for the relationships 
between migrants and their family members in other countries.  
IV.  ECONOMIC EXPRESSIONS OF AFFINITY IN RELATED CONTEXTS 
The remittance economy demonstrates how migrants stay 
connected across borders through economic means. This final Part 
explores how legal controls outside of the banking and financial 
context might account for this reality. Specifically, I focus on the 
meaning that legal and political decisionmakers attribute to 
remittances. 
 
 224.  See Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 1543, 1571–72 (2014).  
 225.  See generally JOANNA DREBY, DIVIDED BY BORDERS: MEXICAN MIGRANTS AND 
THEIR CHILDREN (2010) (exploring stories of migrant parents and the ways in which their 
children influenced their decision to relocate as well as the outcomes of these choices).  
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A. Family Unity 
Physical togetherness and family unity form the basis of critiques 
of immigration enforcement policies designed to separate migrant 
families. But in a world of limited mobility and increased dependence 
on economic expressions of affinity and support, the remittance 
economy requires considering whether there might be forms of family 
separation beyond physical disruptions that the law should target. 
Immigration law has historically relied on family law principles to 
develop family unification theories. Family unification has figured into 
the constitutional contours of immigration law since at least the late 
nineteenth-century. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, 
the Supreme Court recognized and consolidated a general immigration 
power in the hands of Congress and the president,226 and in the early 
part of the twentieth century, the Court took similar steps with regards 
to administrative agencies.227 The Court accomplished this through a 
series of decisions upholding the constitutionality of various Chinese 
exclusion laws.228  
Importantly, despite those decisions, which were grounded in 
sweeping ideas about deference to Congress and the president, notions 
of family unity could blunt the force of the worst impulses of those 
laws.229 Dean Kerry Abrams points to a number of lower court 
decisions in which judges read into the Chinese exclusion laws what 
was effectively a family unity exclusion: “The common law theory of 
marital unity was still so powerful that family unity was treated with 
extraordinary deference—even in the face of an articulation of the 
immigration power that made the state’s authority sound absolute.”230 
 
 226.  See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458, 466–67 (2009). 
 227.  See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative 
State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 26–30, 35–38, 41, 43 (2002) (detailing how the Supreme Court 
developed several facets of administrative law, including deference to administrative factfinders, 
through several immigration cases in the early nineteenth and late twentieth centuries). 
 228.  See Lucy Salyer, Captives of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, 
1891-1905, 76 J. AM. HIST. 91, 114–15 (1989).  
 229.  See Kerry Abrams, The Rights of Marriage: Obergefell, Din, and the Future of 
Constitutional Family Law, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 501, 561–63 (2018). 
 230.  Abrams, supra note 162, at 255. In one notable example, the foreign-born Chinese wife 
and child of a Chinese merchant challenged their exclusion. In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 F. 398, 398 
(C.C.D. Or. 1890). And while the exclusion law specifically exempted “merchants” from the ban, 
the law was silent as to spouses and children. Id. at 398–99. The court in that case interpreted the 
law in a way that suggested the merchant had a “natural right” to the “company of the one, and 
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Physical togetherness was assumed to be the defining feature of 
forming and belonging to a family—living and loving together in the 
same household. Most recently, family unity formed the basis of a 
critique of immigration enforcement measures that caused family 
separation at the U.S.–Mexico border. As part of its anti-smuggling and 
antitrafficking enforcement policies, the Trump administration 
separated children from adult guardians at the border ostensibly to 
protect children from dangerous or predatory adults.231 For many, the 
nature of the harm was obvious and hardly worth exploring: denying 
parents access to their children violated the basic human right to care 
for and live with their children. While these enforcement practices 
undeniably implicated human rights frameworks, they also violated a 
key normative commitment of immigration law—that immigration law 
should recognize and account for familial relationships when allocating 
benefits and imposing sanctions.  
Perhaps it is because physical togetherness is such an obviously 
defining feature of the family unit that courts, lawmakers, and 
regulators have spent such little time defining its importance. The 
implicit goal of family-based admissions categories is for noncitizens to 
live with citizen or lawful permanent resident family members. The 
entire suite of family-based admissions categories reflects this 
principle, as do other categories such as derivative beneficiaries.232 At 
the same time, the broader social science literature documenting how 
migrants experience the adverse effects of both antimigration and anti-
money laundering policies highlights the limits of legal categories. The 
concept of remitting rights does not currently afford courts the 
doctrinal cover to limit executive overreach in its administration of 
national security programs.  
For legal scholars, then, the social realities and meaning 
surrounding the remittance economy present an invitation to critique 
the migration/capital distinction itself. Feminist scholarship provides a 
 
the care and custody of the other,” which could not be displaced unless Congress was absolutely 
clear with its intention to do so. Id. at 399–400.  
 231.  Cf. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1164–65 (S.D. Cal. 
2018) (summarizing the claims against the government as separating parents “from their children 
upon arriving at our nation’s border without any determination they were unfit or presented a 
danger to their children”). 
 232.  See Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 
629, 682 (2014) (identifying family reunification, or the ability to live with family, as an important 
value of immigration law); Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the 
Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 511, 511–13 (1995) (stating that family reunification 
principles influence immigration law and outlining tiers of family preferences in immigration law).  
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rough roadmap as to how such an intervention might unfold. Scholars 
like Peggie Smith,233 Vicki Schultz,234 Nancy Staudt,235 and more 
recently Noah Zatz,236 helpfully critique how conventional definitions 
of work render caregiving duties invisible. For my purposes, the 
significance is that market activities that trigger legal protections, 
namely work, are socially constructed and obfuscate historically 
unequal relationships based in gender, race, and class. A similar 
critique applies to family unity. Immigration provisions covering 
removal cancellation and admission already contain pockets 
recognizing economic obligations grounded in affinity. The working 
pieces to build out an infrastructure already exist. Just because family 
separation harms are triggered by the disruption of physical proximity 
does not mean that such disruptions are the only kinds of family 
separation that merit legal protection, especially in light of the broader 
antimigration policies governing migrant lives.  
The realities of physical and geographic distance mean that 
migrants rely on remittances as a key method of expressing affinity or 
love for family members. Centering the role that remittances play in 
the lives of migrants illustrates how family unity principles are given 
expression beyond physical proximity. Remittances offer one way for 
migrants to remain connected with loved ones in their countries of 
origin. Money transfers operate alongside text messages, video calls, 
and other technological innovations that enable remitters to foster and 
maintain emotional intimacy across the globe.237  
Immigration laws restrict migrant mobility and prevent them from 
visiting family members. Anti-money laundering laws constrain the 
ability of migrants to send remittances to those same family members. 
Legal constructions of family unity, then, reflect the imprimatur of two 
overlapping and complementary sets of laws—those governing 
 
 233.  See Peggie R. Smith, Laboring for Child Care: A Consideration of New Approaches To 
Represent Low-Income Service Workers, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 583, 591 (2006) (noting that 
“child care is frequently dismissed as a form of emotional work that lacks economic visibility and 
value”). 
 234.  See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1899–1900 (2000) (arguing 
that society fails to value housework, childcare, and other work performed at home). 
 235.  See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1573–74 (1996) (arguing 
that society fails to formally acknowledge, and thus value, “women’s work” like housework and 
childrearing).  
 236.  See Noah D. Zatz, Supporting Workers by Accounting for Care, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 45, 58–59 (2011) (criticizing conceptions of work that encompass only paid employment as 
excluding and rendering invisible the work of family caretakers).  
 237.  HEIDBRINK, supra note 39, at 49.  
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migration and those governing capital. Put in slightly different terms, 
the harms of family separation operate on a spectrum in which some 
forms of separation are physical while others are more indirect, as in 
the remittances context.238 Expanding out to include remittance flows 
further develops this idea that even ostensibly voluntary forms of 
separation—such as knowingly and willingly leaving one’s family 
behind to enter the United States for work—inflicts a similar, albeit 
less offensive, form of moral harm compared to family separation at 
the U.S.–Mexico border.  
The remittance economy deepens the understanding of how those 
who lack or possess only tenuous legal statuses experience family 
separation. There are instances in which noncitizens in the United 
States are arbitrarily barred from remitting wages. Banks shut down 
individual accounts because of the frequency of cash deposits239 or shut 
down entire branches because operating in high trafficking and 
laundering zones like border communities is more trouble than it is 
worth.240 Families often pool resources to invest in a single family 
member’s journey to the United States so that they can work and send 
remittances. It is a survival strategy. As beneficiaries of family 
resources, migrants who find themselves unable to or deterred from 
remitting wages can experience trauma similar to survivor’s guilt.241 
Recognizing the affinity-based elements of remittances brings that 
account in line with significant pockets of immigration law that rely on 
similar principles to shape the rights and benefits available to migrants. 
Consider In re Gonzalez Recinas,242 a well-known case examining the 
 
 238.  See Lee, supra note 17, at 2359–63 (describing how anti-money laundering laws hinder 
sending remittances to family abroad). 
 239.  Cf. McKendry, supra note 127 (noting that some banks are reluctant to take on “high 
risk” customers like those involved with the “marijuana business”); Emily Feldman, The U.S.-
Mexico Border Is Becoming a Banking Desert, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 30, 2018 10:42 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/the-u-s-mexico-border-is-becoming-
a-banking-desert [https://perma.cc/48P6-5JBV]. One GAO report found that money laundering-
related risks likely played a significant role in driving bank branch closures in the U.S.–Mexico 
border region. This study surveyed banks and found that a significant percentage of banks in the 
Southwest region reported terminating cash-intensive small business accounts as well as accounts 
involving money services and other businesses involved in cross-border activity. GAO, BANK 
SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, supra note 132, at 19–20.. 
 240.  See GAO, BANK SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, supra 
note 132, at 11–16, 31–33 (describing the difficulties of banking in border communities and 
concluding that the cost of complying with anti-money laundering laws can contribute to bank 
closures).  
 241.  See Heidbrink, supra note 51, at 278. 
 242.  In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002). 
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kinds of equitable factors that might support an affirmative grant of 
canceling removal.243 It examined whether Ariadna Recinas, a 
removable noncitizen, was entitled to “cancellation of removal,” a 
form of relief that allows a removable migrant to remain in the United 
States.244 As part of its hardship assessment, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals considered Recinas’s business with two employees and her 
automobile ownership.245 Importantly, this discussion was embedded 
within a broader analysis of how Recinas’s deportation and subsequent 
collapse of her business would impact her children within the United 
States due to her inability to support them financially.246 In other 
words, the Board considered Recinas’s investments in the United 
States to be equity gained through time spent supporting her family. 
Uprooting her would also harm her two children.  
Another example is the affidavit of support requirement that all 
sponsors must complete in order to sponsor family members as a part 
of the visa application process.247 Sponsors must promise to provide 
financial support for their noncitizen family members to reduce the 
likelihood that new members strain public resources by slipping into 
poverty.248 These affidavits amount to legally enforceable promises to 
support and ensure the economic well-being of visa recipients. 
Moreover, the only category of recipients for whom affidavits are 
required are family-based recipients.249 Both the cancellation of 
removal and affidavit of support illustrate the different ways that law 
currently recognizes the significance of economic support in assessing 
the legitimacy of familial bonds. The example of anti-money 
laundering laws highlights how Treasury officials also use financial 
records and economic activity in ways that allow them to track and 
observe familial relationships with and among noncitizens in the 
United States.  
 
 243.  See id. at 468–73.  
 244.  See id. at 467–68. 
 245.  Id. at 470.  
 246.  Id. at 471. 
 247.  See Immigrant Visa Process, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE – BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-process/step-1-
submit-a-petition/affidavit-of-support.html [https://perma.cc/7JYR-89V4]. 
 248.  See id.  
 249.  Those who seek to sponsor noncitizens in other categories such as employment and 
diversity may be required to do so at the discretion of immigration officials but are not required 
to do so by statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1) (setting forth terms for a sponsor’s affidavit of 
support). 
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B. Wage Earnings 
Remittances are often the product of wage earnings. For this 
reason, the regulatory influence of anti-money laundering laws 
implicates the various workplace laws that protect migrants in the 
United States. A significant strand of legal scholarship focuses on 
migrants as workers and workplace laws.250 Much of this scholarship is 
heavily informed by economic analysis and dominated by practical 
questions about how to balance the societal benefits of new migrant 
workers against the costs borne by native-born workers. 
Unsurprisingly, the focus has been on empirical questions: whether 
migrants will function as supplements or substitutes to native-born 
workers;251 whether the economic contributions of immigrant workers 
offset the dilution of public resources;252 and whether these economic 
impacts are differently experienced by native-born workers across 
regions of the country.253  
Those who theorize immigrant work and advance normative 
claims quite sensibly try to meld claims for migrant inclusion into this 
labor-centric view of immigration law. This body of work highlights the 
economic productivity of migrants and explores whether and how the 
economic interests of migrant workers meld with those of native 
 
 250.  See generally, e.g., Shannon Gleeson & Kati L. Griffith, Employers as Subjects of the 
Immigration State: How the State Foments Employment Insecurity for Temporary Immigrant 
Workers, 46 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 92 (2021) (arguing that migrants with temporary protected 
status have more difficulty obtaining and maintaining employment than do permanent residents 
due to stringent bureaucratic requirements); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 
80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007) (advocating for transnational labor citizenship, which “would link 
permission to enter the United States in search of work to membership in cross-border worker 
organizations,” not to a specific employer). I have also contributed to this conversation. See 
generally Stephen Lee, Screening for Solidarity, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (2013) (arguing that 
migrant workers who assert labor claims should receive preference for immigration benefits).  
 251.  See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration and the 
Case for Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 8–9 
(2008) (discussing empirical evidence demonstrating that migrant labor does not substitute for 
native labor). 
 252.  See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy of Emigration 
and Immigration, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234, 271–74 (2006) (discussing dueling empirical studies 
concerning burdens that immigration places on the welfare state). 
 253.  See Jennifer Gordon, Tensions in Rhetoric and Reality at the Intersection of Work and 
Immigration, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 125, 138–43 (2012) [hereinafter Gordon, Tensions in Rhetoric 
and Reality] (discussing more particularized effects of immigration and the need for additional 
study). See generally GIOVANNI PERI, THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS IN RECESSION AND 
ECONOMIC EXPANSION (2010), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Peri-June2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KC4D-JXFM] (discussing the effects of immigration on employment and 
income).  
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workers.254 Both advocates255 and regulators256 have understandably 
focused on notions of economic productivity to advance arguments in 
favor of mass legalization programs because migrants have “earned” 
legalization.257 
The reality of remittances and the law regulating the transnational 
economy exposes precisely the point at which these sorts of arguments 
become politically vulnerable. The broad and inclusive nature of labor 
protections are negotiated and implemented within a political 
environment with streaks of nativism and nationalism.258 Those on the 
political right often invoke nativist sentiments to argue against 
increasing migration opportunities. One could imagine a similar sort of 
argument that remittance flows represent capital leaving the United 
States, thereby representing migrants’ economic disloyalty toward 
their adopted home.259 This reality highlights the ease with which labor-
 
 254.  From the perspective of migrant plaintiffs, this has been a productive legal pursuit given 
that several courts and agencies extend workplace laws to workers regardless of immigration 
status. But there are some limitations to what this labor-centric approach to immigration law can 
provide, and the realities surrounding the remittance economy highlight these limitations. See 
Stephen Lee, Undocumented Civil Procedure, in A CRITICAL GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(Brooke Coleman, Suzette Malveaux, Portia Pedro & Elizabeth Porter eds., forthcoming 2021). 
 255.  See generally, e.g., Giovanni Peri, The Economic Benefits of Immigration, BERKELEY 
REV. LATIN AM. STUDS., Fall 2013, at 14 (discussing economic benefits of immigration).  
 256.  See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Important Role of Immigrants 
in Our Economy, Remarks at the 2013 Annual Gala of the Georgia Hispanic Chamber of 
Commerce (May 18, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch051813laahtm 
[https://perma.cc/55K3-A2E9] (discussing the economic benefits of immigration).  
 257.  Indeed, despite internal struggles and dissension, over the last couple of decades, 
mainstream labor organizations have embraced the interests of migrant workers. See Janice Fine 
& Daniel J. Tichenor, A Movement Wrestling: American Labor’s Enduring Struggle with 
Immigration, 1866–2007, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 84, 111 (2009). 
 258.  See George J. Sánchez, Face the Nation: Race, Immigration, and the Rise of Nativism in 
Late Twentieth Century America, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1009, 1021 (1997). 
 259.  In a satirical essay, Professor Yxta Murray voices a set of recommendations to President 
Trump as a journalist with right-wing extremist tendencies. Yxta Maya Murray, A Modest Memo, 
22 MICH. J. RACE & L. 187, 187 (2017). On the subject of remittances specifically, Professor 
Murray channels this position to address the position that “remittances to Mexican family 
members qualify as symbols of love and utter sacrifice on the part hard-working economic 
refugees.” Id. at 207. Imploring President Trump to lump remittances into his broader project of 
attacking Mexican Americans, Murray reminds President Trump that he “will help us see 
remittances not as icons of loving-kindness, but rather as polluted, stolen property.” Id. 
Embedded within Professor Murray’s satirical analysis is fodder for real-life restrictionists 
pressing the case for expanding enforcement efforts against migrants. See Matthew O’Brien, 
Spencer Raley & Casey Ryan, The United States Loses $150 Billion Annually in Remittances, 
FAIR (May 2019), https://www.fairus.org/issue/publications-resources/united-states-loses-150-
billion-annually-remittances [https://perma.cc/Y32X-628B].  
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centric accounts of unauthorized work can slide into unproductive 
debates about economic nationalism.  
The restrictionist approach to labor migration partially reflects the 
absence of a compelling normative vision for how the law should count 
migrants’ economic contributions. Theories about the legal benefits of 
earning wages do not fully account for spending choices made by 
migrants. This economic security, in turn, enables workers to 
recirculate their earnings through the consumption of goods and 
services thereby growing the national economy. For migrant workers 
embedded within transnational families, the recirculation of earnings 
is expressed through remittances, which benefits the economies of 
other countries.  
Debates in this area are often framed in terms of identifying the 
winners and losers among the dominant economic interests in the 
United States. In reductive terms, both migration (especially 
unauthorized migration) and trade benefit American businesses by 
giving them access to cheaper sources of labor.260 Similarly, both 
migration and trade create benefits for American consumers when 
businesses pass along the costs savings to the public. Assessing the 
economic consequences of migration and trade becomes more 
complicated when considering native-born workers. Increases in 
migration and expanded reliance on imported goods can cause certain 
labor markets to shrink in the United States, hence harming the 
economic interests of native-born workers, which places workers on a 
different footing than businesses and consumers. As a result, much of 
the research is empirical: Are migrant workers supplements or 
substitutes for native-born workers?261 Do the economic contributions 
of migrants offset the increase in public expenditures? Are these gains 
and losses spread evenly across the nation or only regionally?262  
The reality of remittances can also complicate normative 
commitments that might otherwise be obvious. While there is much in 
the economic lives of migrants that remains to be theorized, one way 
forward is to account for the social meaning of work for migrants more 
explicitly and to let that social reality inform the substance and reach 
 
 260.  See Motomura, supra note 219; KIMBERLY CLAUSING, OPEN: THE PROGRESSIVE CASE 
FOR FREE TRADE, IMMIGRATION, AND GLOBAL CAPITAL 141–42 (2019); Gordon, supra note 
219, at 1131.  
 261.  See Chang, supra note 251 (discussing empirical evidence demonstrating that migrant 
labor does not substitute for native labor). 
 262.  See, e.g., Gordon, Tensions in Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 255, at 140–41.  
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of workplace protections. For example, a number of legal scholars 
theorize core employment protections like minimum wage laws in 
terms of social equality. These social equality scholars have provided a 
theoretical base that could be expanded to account for remittance flow. 
Several scholars argue that employment protection generally, and 
minimum wage protections specifically, not only protect workers 
against wage theft, but they also operate to ensure a degree of social 
equality.263 In the context of wage protections, Professor Brishen 
Rogers argues that “[g]iven the all-too-recent historical context of 
slavery and serfdom, the very payment of wages is a powerful 
indication of workers’ moral equality.”264  
At the same time, scholarship in this area does not explicitly 
contemplate the transnational dimensions of immigrant work that 
transpires in the United States. Social equality scholars have embraced 
concepts that are tethered to a purely domestic life. For example, 
Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos explains that the social equality 
principle “demands that inequalities in economic position (which may 
be beneficial or inevitable) not be automatically replicated into 
inequalities in other areas of life that are key to participation in 
society.”265 Thus, a worker’s relatively modest economic success should 
not lock in those disadvantages in terms of “access to the political 
process, community self-government, the process of petitioning for 
redress of grievances, or the protections of the law.”266  
Still, the basic contours of the social equality account provide an 
opening for thinking through what equality means to workers 
embedded within transnational families. Returning to Rogers, he 
helpfully argues that wage protections provide workers with “greater 
self-respect as well as more time for leisure, caregiving, or other 
activities through which to achieve self-realization.”267 But realizing 
these benefits in transnational familial relationships would unfold 
differently than for workers who live with or near family members and 
 
 263.  See Rogers, supra note 224, at 1570–88 (arguing that “minimum wage laws help ensure 
decent work and social equality for low-wage workers”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law 
and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 243–73 (2013) (arguing that “employment law rules 
pervasively implicate questions of social equality” and analyzing employment law through a social 
equality lens); Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to 
Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 23–27 (discussing the civil rights justifications 
for the minimum wage).  
 264.  Rogers, supra note 224, at 1571. 
 265.  Bagenstos, supra note 263, at 236. 
 266.  Id. at 237. 
 267.  Rogers, supra note 224, at 1592. 
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loved ones. For many migrant workers, leisure would not involve 
sharing meals or taking walks together (at least not with family 
members who remain in the migrant’s country of origin). It would more 
likely involve using wages to pay for electronic devices or Internet 
services that could facilitate videocalls or remitting some wages so 
family members can gain similar access.268 A social equality vision of 
the law already meshes well with scholarly accounts of antimigration 
policies. A number of legal scholars have already demonstrated how 
immigration enforcement exacerbates inequality in the wage context. 
Marrying these accounts to anti-money laundering policies would help 
complete the picture of how migrant workers experience inequality as 
workers: that even if they are able to secure all of the wages they are 
owed, they face additional costs and indignities in translating those 
wages into benefits measured through leisure and caregiving. Because 
migrant workers are more likely to be embedded within transnational 
families than native-born workers, they are disproportionately 
impacted by the costs created by anti-money laundering practices in 
supporting family members. 
A less extreme version of this same argument might pressure 
consumers and workers within the United States to buy American in 
certain instances. Even if legal tools like tariffs have a spotty or 
unsavory historical record, the general idea that law might be used to 
encourage spending within the American economy could be 
defensible. But even if such an idea is generally defensible, it is hard to 
make that case for remittances. It feels odd to demand that migrant 
workers spend their money within the United States when the reason 
that many remit wages is because immigration laws do not create 
meaningful opportunities for them to regularize their status or to admit 
their family members.269 This is not just the case for unauthorized 
migrants, but also for lawful permanent residents and citizen migrants 
who are subject to long wait times for visas for family members.  
The empirical consequences of the remittance economy are less 
apparent because the negative impacts on Americans are less visible. 
Increased migration, especially of low-skilled workers, harms native-
born workers by expanding the supply of workers and rendering wages 
 
 268.  See Valerie Francisco, ‘The Internet is Magic’: Technology, Intimacy and Transnational 
Families, 41 CRITICAL SOCIO. 173, 175 (2015) (describing how transnational families use 
computer technology to keep in touch).  
 269.  See id. (framing the need for immigrants to resort to computer technology to keep in 
touch as a result of immigration laws that prevent in-person interaction).  
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stagnant, at least in industries where migrant workers serve as 
substitutes. By contrast, the harm from remittances is much more 
diffuse because it affects U.S. businesses and consumers rather than 
workers. The argument here is that wages or earnings that flow out of 
the country could have been spent or reinvested in the United States, 
thereby expanding the consumer base for U.S. businesses. There might 
be some truth to this claim, but the consequences are much harder to 
identify. While some U.S. businesses might lose out on migrants’ 
disposable income, others, like the financial services sector or 
transportation services (for those who are carrying or paying others to 
carry remittances to family members), certainly benefit. 
Ultimately, there many reasons to support using the law to protect 
migrant wage earnings. But most of the thinking in this arena focuses 
on protecting wage earnings without taking into account whether and 
how these wage earnings end up in the pockets of a migrant’s family. 
This focuses on a migrant’s livelihood without considering the rest of a 
migrant’s life. For migrants, giving meaning to one’s body, mind, and 
heart is a project that requires disaggregation and that unfolds across 
multiple countries. Blending analyses of anti-money laundering and 
antimigration laws with family law and employment law can help 
reveal the quiet violence of moving across a border in one direction to 
send funds back in the other direction. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on the centrality of anti-money 
laundering policies in regulating migration. Viewing the broader legal 
system from this vantage point illustrates that anti-money laundering 
and antimigration policies developed in tandem to ensure a broadly 
conceived notion of public security against vague threats of foreign 
elements. Together, these legal tools enable legal and political actors 
to expand their reach not only over transnational remittance flows, but 
also over the conditions of admission and deportation of migrants. The 
harms emerge in remittance deserts and are experienced as the loss of 
economic expressions of affinity. In short, these laws work together to 
regulate the lives and livelihood of migrants. The harms of this system 
have mostly eluded legal scholars, so this Article presents the 
opportunity to contribute to important and ongoing discussions central 
to reform projects in the immigration law space. Finally, this Article 
shows that family separation harms operate along a spectrum and have 
become normalized in the modern era. One way that advocates and 
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legal decision-makers can slowly begin the process of integrating family 
separation into the legal infrastructure of U.S. financial institutions is 
to accord proper weight to the social meaning of remittances—namely, 
the long-distance, digitized expressions of familial relationships meant 
to preserve an emotional bond that one day may be enjoyed in person. 
 
